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INTRODUCTION 
General 
It is the general purpose of this study to acquaint the reader with 
a history of bridge failures. Some of these failures are very major with 
much loss in lives and dollars, while some are rather minor. However, it 
is frequently impossible to draw a line between major failures and minor 
failures when considering the lessons which may and should be learned. 
Lessons can be learned by a summary of all bridge failures and an analysis 
of the factors associated with those failures. 
There are many failures which occur and are never heard about by 
the general public. They may be listed and described in detail, but kept 
forever in some secret file for various reasons. Some may be settled 
out of court with respect to responsibility, or the person responsible 
chooses to keep the failure secret to protect his reputation. Many 
failures are learned about through technical papers and magazines, partic-
ularly failures of a minor nature. Thus, only technical people become 
aware of them. 
Experience can be a very expensive teacher but it is usually the 
best teacher. In reviewing past bridge failures it is natural that the 
ones with the greatest loss of life will probably be the ones to remain 
in the minds of the public, although the technical person must realize 
that all types of past failures must be given equal considerations as a 
recurrence may be under different circumstances. 
The bridge failures summarized in this report are grouped under 
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headings listing the type of failure. It is unfortunate that there is 
one cause of failure which exists probably more often than any other --
carelessness during construction -- which is an error which may always 
be present. Ignorance, however, may be a factor and there are times 
when the economics of the construction sacrifices many lives. The most 
critical period in the ,life of a structure is often during the construc-
tion period. There is a critical stage during construction, and after 
this stage the engineer can partially relax and be satisfied that his 
design is stable. Of course there are other tests which the structure 
must also face during its early performance. But after construction is 
satisfactorily completed, a very Large part of the battle is won. 
Failures resulting not from insufficiencies of the structural design 
of the completed work but from unexpected movements and loadings during 
construction are, in the pub lie mind, not distinguished from structura 1 
design failures. Such incidents occur quite often near the completion 
of a job when progress is at the maximum scheduled rate and manpower is 
not sufficient to provide all the necessary precautions against failure. 
Failures are very often due to lack of inspection or the economics 
involved in a particular project which leads to carelessness or neglect, 
Many major bridge failures in this report are primarily caused by lack of 
inspection. The Kings Bridge in Melbourne, Australia is a well known 
and recent example where the designer failed to accept or demand respon-
sibility of the field inspection (15, 45, 53). A very essential safe-
guard against failure is strict and competent supervision and inspection 
by skilled foremen, architects and engineers throughout the construction 
operation. 
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Much is known about structures today and failures of completed 
structures are not as frequent as they once were, at least those which 
are caused by improper design. Most of the failures in completed struc-
tures are a result of dishonest performance and noncompliance due to 
ignorance or a matter of economics rather than improper design. 
Structural failures have occurred since the beginning of time and 
in all types of structures. Most of these failures are not publicly 
known nor are they known even by engineers who will design a structure 
using criteria which possibly has already been proven wrong or unsatis-
factory in a failure in the past. Reasons for a collapse may not be 
determined before a lengthy investigation has taken place and by that 
time there is probably little interest remaining in the incident. The 
cause of minor accidents is seldom announced. There are more lessons 
which can be learned by the knowledge of past failures than by the sue-
cesses. Therefore there should be reports of all types of failures --
failures not necessarily meaning collapse of a structure but using the 
engineering definition " ... whenever a structure ceases to perform in a 
manner for which it was designed." 
Following is a list of causes of failures which are very common 
and will become apparent to the reader in this summary: 
1. Ignorance 
a. Incompetent men in charge of design, construction or 
inspection 
b. Supervision and maintenance by men without necessary 
knowledge or experience 
c. Lack of sufficient preliminary information 
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d. Revision of design by persons lacking knowledge of the 
original requirements 
2. Economy 
a. Restrictions in initial cost 
b. Lack of maintenance 
3. Carelessness during construction 
a. An engineer, usually competent and careful, shows neg-
ligence in some part of a design 
b. A contractor takes a chance while completely aware of 
the risks involved 
c. Lack of coordination in production of plans, construc-
tion procedures and inspection 
4. Unusual occurrences 
Legal Responsibilities 
Every time a failure occurs a legal finger must point to someone 
which may cause embarrassment and may even mean professiona 1 ruin for 
many. It is not the intention of this summary to point a finger at any-
one, but only to familiarize the reader with the failures in some detail 
along with the cause, if available, so· that there may be lessons learned. 
The matter of where to place the legal responsibility is a factor 
which is very difficult to obtain, especially in the case of foundation 
failures. The responsibility is frequently placed predominantly with 
the engineer, even though the failure is the result of ignorance or 
negligence of the construction contractors. This is caused by the fact 
that any errors made during construction should be spotted by the 
engineer or his inspector on the job. Errors of judgment are no longer 
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used as a defense. There is a we 11 known phrase -- "A medica 1 doc tor 
buries his mistakes, an architect covers his mistakes with ivy, and the 
engineer must write a long report on his mistake." 
There may soon be a need for a meeting of all the phases of the con-
struction industry to clarify the limits of responsibility for project 
concept, design, detail, material production and assembly, construction 
direction, and supervision. If each performs his service properly by 
hiring the necessary experienced personnel, and if he does not attempt 
to do the job required of another, then there may be much greater success 
and freedom from failure. 
Methods of Control 
A safety factor which has been developed over the years is the 
establishment of quality standards for materials and workmanship, and 
for design practice, by the American Society for Testing Materials, the 
American Welding Society, the American Concrete Institute, the American 
Institute of Steel Construction, and other similar organizations. Also 
becoming important is specialization brought about through registration. 
Quite often a person qualified to perform a specific service will attempt 
to perform services for which he is not qualified. This may not be ap-
parent to the person hiring him for his services and is unethical as a 
member of his profession. 
A technical control bureau has been established in Europe which was 
started as a result of a great number of construction failures occurring 
in the 1920's. This is a private organization set up to qualify projects 
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for construction liability and damage insurance. This organization, which 
investigates ways to control construction practices, has control over 
field inspections and supervision and also approves designs. A technical 
control bureau would seem to be a practical way of maintaining standards 
of public safety while avoiding greater government control. Some ad-
vantages would be: 
1. To unify the responsibility for control of a project 
2. More efficient use of trained construction personnel could be 
made. A trained inspector could be stationed ona job, or visit 
a number of jobs on a coordinated schedule, rather than imposing 
sporadic interruptions in design office schedule when the 
engineer must perform job inspection. 
3. Testing laboratory standards could be raised by abolishing 
price competition. 
4. A direct financial motive for insuring good designs and con-
forming construction would be provided. Since the control 
bureau is tied in with an insurance plan which must pay off in 
cash in event of failure, motivation will be toward strictness 
of control, for example, the high standards of inspection now 
maintained by fire insurance companies. 
5. It provides a technical staff trained to see projects with 
fresh and unbiased viewpoints. 
This would seem to be a very desirable system and would eliminate 
many failures which recur time after time, indicative of the insufficiency 
of voluntary participation in promoting existing knowledge. 
It is apparent that much improvement has been made when comparing 
the number of bridges built and the number of failures in recent years 
with those at the beginning of the twentieth century. There are many 
more specifications and building codes today to guide the designer and 
builder. These building codes have been based partly on experience 
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learned from failures in the past and partly on experimental and theoret-
ical investigations through the years. 
Objectives 
Many lessons have been learned and will continue to be learned. By 
summarizing the past failures of bridges and the causes of the failures 
it is hoped that the same type of failure will not recur. It is, how-
ever, apparent that they do recur and are possibly caused by the same 
error. If designers, inspectors, owners, and builders would all become 
aware of the types of failures and their causes, a great advancement 
would be made toward safer structures. It is hoped that the engineering 
profession and the construction industry can learn by the mistakes of 
others and can thereby avoid unnecessary repetition of failures in the 
past. This report is written in the hope that by contributing to the 
better understanding of reasons for failure and a knowledge of bridge 
failures and types of bridge failures in the past, that future failures 
of the types discussed may be substantially reduced. 
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FAILURES DUE TO DESIGN ERRORS 
General 
There are six bridge failures summarized in this report which were 
caused mainly by error in design. This is one of the most common causes 
of collapse or failure. 
Errors in design are many times a result of carelessness on the part 
of the designer and many times just a result of human error. Most of the 
design errors today are eliminated by the use of electronic computation 
methods and by a check of the design by a competent person before the 
detailed plans are distributed to the contractors for bids. 
During the first 20 or 30 years of this century the designs were 
made by the steel fabricator or the bridge contractor. This would ob-
viously result in more chance for error and would certainly place a 
greater burden of responsibility on the inspector. The designer would 
compute the allowable stresses for each member and these would be shown 
on a drawing of the structure. During the construction operation the 
inspector at the erection site would be required to calculate the actual 
stresses in each member as the erection progressed. 
The following report is intended to make the reader more aware of 
the seriousness of design errors and the circumstances by which they 
occur. 
Second Narrows Bridge 
There were 18 lives lost as a result of the collapse of two spans 
of the Second Narrows Bridge at Vancouver, B,C., during its construction 
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on June 17, 1956 (61, 74, 92). The construction cost was estimated at 
$3~ million at the time. This bridge was a $16 million structure which 
was to connect Vancouver and suburban Vancouver. The completed structure 
was to be 4250 ft. long and was being built for the provincial government 
as part of a $23 million express highway project included in the Trans-
Canada highway network. 
The collapse involved a cantilever portion which was being extended 
to reach a pier. This cantilever was being supported by temporary piers, 
one of which was in place at the time of the collapse, There was 345 ft. 
of cantilever beyond a main pier when, according to eye witnesses, the 
temporary supporting legs buckled. This impact moved the top of the main 
pier and caused the collapse of the preceding span. There were 79 work-
men on these spans at the time of the collapse. It was estimated that 
further construction would be delayed about six months and that about 
half the steel could be salvaged and re-used. 
The cause of the collapse was due to buckling of the ""bs of steel 
beams at the base of the temporary pier being used to support the canti-
levered portion as it was being extended to a main pier. Instability of 
the temporary pier was due to omission of stiffeners and effective dia-
phragming in the steel grillage atop the concrete pile system. Two of 
the 18 who died in the accident were engineers responsible for the error 
in calculation. The grillage consisted of four rolled steel I-beam 
sections at the top of each pile group. It was testified that two mis-
takes had been made in the calculations by the Dominion Bridge Company, 
the steel erectors, which led to weaknesses in the grillage. One mistake 
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was that the entire area of the beam had been used in computing the shear 
strength whereas only the web area should have been used. As a result 
the computed shear stress was only about one-half of the correct value. 
The second mistake was in checking the need for web stiffeners. This was 
based on a l in. flange instead of the 0.653 in. web thickness. 
It had been testified that one of the mistakes had been found prior 
to the collapse by someone in the design office but, unfortunately, no 
action was taken. 
Lincoln Highway Bascule 
The east leaf of a two-leaf drawspan over Hackensack River between 
Jersey City and Newark, New Jersey, failed while being lowered on Decem-
ber 15, 1928 (2, 8, 43, 51, 52). Each of the leaves were 98 ft. long 
and 48 ft. wide. It had been in operation less than two years and car-
ried a large amount of vehicular traffic. 
The bridge consisted of a counterweight system as shown in Figure 1. 
The counterweight consisted of a block of concrete 20'-0" high, 11'-6" 
wide and 48 1 -10" long and weighed 750 tons. The vertical distance of 
the bottom of the counterweight above the roadway varied from 7 to 29 
feet. The failure took place when the counterweight was approximately 
at the half-way point, at which time the span together with the counter-
"'3ight fell into the river. The failure took place in the north leg of 
the counterweight tower. There was a complete fracture at the base of 
the leg. The leg being made up of channels with lacing showed a partly 
rusted tension break in the rear channel and a bending and tensile break 
in the other resulting in a forward thrust of the counterweight into 
11 
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Figure 1. Diagram of counterweight system of Hackensack River 
Bridge (52) 
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the river. 
A board of engineers was appointed to make an investigation into the 
failure and they made stress measurements on the undamaged west leaf 
during its operation and found it to be in a state of potential failure. 
The board reported on observations on the failed structure, observations 
on the remaining structure, and computed stresses. It was observed that 
the failure was caused entirely by fracture of the north leg of the east 
counterweight tower. There were indications of old cracks which had oc-
curred at different times previous to the accident. The metal within the 
tower, however, appeared to be of good quality. 
Observations made on the west structure while being operated at a 
slow rate showed signs of great stress in the counterweight tower with a 
result of bowing of the tower lacing. Strain gauges were placed on the 
channels near the base and a stress of 25,500 psi was observed. A de-
flection of the top of the tower l'as found to be over a range of 0 .48 
feet. 
The factors considered when computing stresses were: wind on the 
counterweight of 30 psf, the torque produced by trunnion friction, 
stresses from starting and stopping plus stresses produced by periodic 
motion. The result was a very great overstress in the counterweight 
tower legs. 
The Strauss Engineering Corporation of Chicago, the bridge de-
signers, made their own analysis as to the cause of the failure. They 
reported that the failure was due to abnormally high friction developed 
at the counterweight trunnion bearing (tail bearing) of the north truss 
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and the condition aggravated by the poor quality of the bronze bushings. 
Investigation of the trunnion bearings showed discolored surfaces which 
indicated possible faulty lubrication. Also, some bearings were plugged 
in such a way that lubrication was impossible and poor workmanship was 
found in the polished surfaces of the bearings. A chemical analysis was 
made of the bushings which indicated a lack of uniformity in the metal 
and showed the presence of antimony which was not indicated in the speci-
fications. A review of the files indicated that some of the bearings 
had been rejected but had been shipped without inspection and were in-
stalled. 
After an investigation by Strauss Engineering Corporation it was 
concluded that the prime cause of the failure was the abnormally high 
friction developed at the counterweight trunnion bearing of the north 
truss which was a result of poor lubrication and poor quality bronze 
bushings. 
The final report of the investigating board of engineers re-
asserted what was brought out in their preliminary report and computed 
the separate items of stress acti.on affecting the counterweight tower. 
These were combined as follows: 
1. Combined effect of emergency brakes, specified friction, 
15 lb. wind load and measured elastic vibration 
61,700 psi 
2. Combined effect of motor brakes, emergency brakes and speci-
fied friction 
60, 600 psi 
3. Combined effect of motor brakes, emergency brakes, friction 
and 15 lb. wind load 
74,600 psi 
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4. Combined effect of motor brakes, emergency brakes, specified 
friction and measured elastic vibration 
74,700 psi 
5. Combined effect of motor brakes, emergency brakes, specified 
friction measured elastic vibration and 15 lb. wind load 
88,700 psi 
Any one of the above combinations could have resulted in failure as 
they were greater than the yield point of the steel. There also was a 
large amount of stress reversal and repetition which brought into play 
an endurance limit below the ultimate strength. 
The final report of the board of engineers appointed to investigate 
the cause of the failure indicated that inadequate design was the primary 
cause of the collapse of the counterweight tower. 
The above results of calculations were challenged by C. E. Paine, 
Vice President of Strauss Engineering Corporation (2). The following 
is the result of calculations up to this point (2). 
Table 1. Calculations of stresses in counterweight tower 
C. E. Paine Board of engineers 
Due to deceleration + 22,200 + 69 ,600 
Due to 15 lb. wind + 14' 000 + 14 ,000 
Due to friction 8,500 9,000 
Total with wind + 27,700 + 74' 600 
Total without wind + 13' 700 + 60,600 
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The board checked the calculations made by C. E. Paine and found 
several errors which are shown in Table 2 (2). 
Table 2. Revised calculations of stresses in counterweight tower 
Deceleration 
Osc i lla ti on 
15 lb. wind 
Friction 
Total primary stress 
with wind 
Total primary stress 
without wind 
Secondary stress 
Maximum unit stress 
Yield point 
Paine analysis 
C. E. Paine (as corrected by board) 
+ 22,200 + 29,300 
Not given + 14 ,650 
+ 14,000 + 14,000 
8,500 3,800 
+ 27 '700 + 54' 150 
+ 13,700 + 40,150 
Not included + 12 ,450 
+ 27,700 + 66,600 
Not given + 36,000 
From the tabulated stresses consider a combination of deceleration 
stress, oscillation stress, one-half wind, and trunnion friction. The 
result of this combination, as corrected by the board, is 47,150 psi 
which is large enough to account for failure. The greatest error above 
was due to the fact that oscillations would be damped by friction and 
that the effect of oscillation may be ignored. The fact that the fracture 
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in the tower channel was progressive and occurred at three different 
times, as clearly shown by the appearance of the fracture, demonstrates 
that the failure was caused by recurring conditions of overstress. 
Tacoma Narrows Bridge 
Probably one of the most dramatic bridge failures was the collapse 
of the Tacoma Narrows suspension bridge which spanned Pudget Sound at 
its narrowest point at Tacoma Narrows (36, 56, 62, 75, 98, 104). (See 
Figure 2). The channel was 4600 ft.wide at the bridge site. 
The bridge consisted of a central span of 2800 ft., two side spans 
of 1100 ft. each, a west approach 450 ft. long of continuous steel 
girder construction and an east approach 210 ft, long of reinforced con-
crete frame construction. There were two cable anchorages, a 26 ft. 
roadway, two 5 ft. sidewalks and two 8 ft. deep stiffening girders. 
The reinforced concrete deck was supported by 5 longitudinal steel 
stringers which were tied together by floor beams 25 ft. apart which were 
connected to the two main girders. The girders were 39 ft. apart and 
were in a vertical plane with the two suspension cables. The two main 
towers which supported the three suspended spans were 450 ft. above low 
water level of the channel. The anchorages to which the suspension 
cables were connected contained 20,000 cu. yds. of concrete, 270,000 lbs. 
of reinforcing steel, and 600,000 lbs. of structural steel. The total 
cost of the bridge was $6,469,770. It was opened to traffic on July 1, 
1940. For details of the bridge see Figure 3. 
The collapse of the center span took place at 10:00 a.m. on 
Figure 2. 
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Location of Tacoma Narrows Bridge (56) 
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November 7, 1940 during a 42 m.p.h. southerly wind blowing at about 45° 
to the roadway. Large vertical oscillations of large amplitudes took 
place. At first the roadway remained horizontal in the transverse direc-
tion but eventually the opposite sides of the roadway began to oscillate 
out of phase with each other and the main span began to break up and 
drop into the Sound. 
There had been a considerable amount of comment from motorists prior 
to the collapse about the motion of the bridge deck. Even the workmen 
had noticed some motion during the final stages of construction. Many 
motorists detoured long distances to avoid re-crossing the bridge. There 
were various types of wave motion observed with amplitudes as great as 
5 ft. in the vertical direction, but with very little side sway. Very 
large wave motion was sometimes noticed with a very low velocity wind 
and sometimes very little motion observed with high winds, so the amount 
of wave motion seemed to be independent of the wind velocity. The wave 
motion most often observed was that of two nodes and a frequency of 12 
to 14 cycles per minute. For the various modes observed, see Figure 4. 
About one hour and thirty minutes prior to the collapse of the 
center span the bridge received special attention because the frequency 
increased considerably. The main span began vibrating in about eight 
segments with double amplitudes of about three feet and a frequency of 
about 36 cycles per minute. 
About an hour before collapse the vibration was in two segments 
with a node at the center of the main span, the two sides of the roadway 
began to vibrate out of phase with each other resulting in one side 
·~·· 
... 
Figure 4. 
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going up while the other side was going down. Many photographs have 
shown this particular action. The deck would tilt to about 30° with 
the horizontal and the amplitudes increased to about 14 feet. The dif-
ference in elevation of the two sides of the roadway would be about 
28 ft. at maximum amplitude. 
There were two cars on the bridge at the time of maximum motion of 
the deck. The occupants of the cars escaped without injury but were 
quite shaken. As the cars were tossed from one curb to the other the 
occupants jumped out and were able only to crawl to safety on their hands 
and knees. 
After the collapse there was only about 400 ft. remaining of the 
center span deck, the end spans had about 30 ft. of deflection and the 
towers were deflected about 12 ft. towards the shore. The towers de-
flected as much as 17 ft. just prior to their obtaining an equilibrium 
condition. 
The investigation board's report on the cause of the failure showed 
that there was no evidence of faulty workmanship or poor materials. The 
bridge was very adequate in its ability to carry the live loads for 
which it was designed. The primary cause lies in the general propor-
tions of the bridge. When comparing this bridge with others in the past 
which have had no real problems such as this one, it was found that 
forces which were almost negligible in those of large ratio of width to 
span length became dominant forces in this bridge. It was not stiff 
enough to withstand the aerodynamic forces and the design was lacking in 
capacity to dissipate energy and to dampen the distortions caused by 
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wind forces. 
It was apparent that a system of truss type stiffener girders would 
have been affected less by the wind forces than the solid type girders. 
An investigation was made in a laboratory wind tunnel following the col-
lapse and it was observed that the actual motion of the bridge would be 
even more uncertain due to gusts and wind variations. 
Hydraulic buffers had been designed to dampen the oscillations. 
These were located at the main towers but seemed to be ineffective in 
the purpose for which they were designed. All means of damping known 
'*'re used in the structure and more were being studied at the time of the 
collapse. The methods tried had been used on other suspension bridges 
and seemed quite satisfactory with very little wave motion of the bridge. 
The prime concern was the discomfort to people traveling over the bridge 
and the wear on moving parts. There never was a fear of failure of the 
Tacoma Narrows Bridge. 
Diagonal guys had been installed at the center of the main span to 
help resist longitudinal motion of the deck as vibration.took place. As 
the floor began to oscillate there was a change in the sag of the cable. 
This, of course, could only be possible by horizontal motion of the cable 
at the center of the span. It had been concluded that these diagonal 
guys had a great effect on the failure of the bridge. It was found 
during the investigation that one of the guys had been slipping along the 
main cable. When one cable became ineffective the cable on the other 
side of the roadway became stressed much greater and an out-of-phase 
oscillation took place. The sudden slipping of the cable would also have 
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an effect on the dynamic stresses. The sensitivity of the bridge to 
torsion was greater with only one guy acting than with no guys at all. 
The increased distortions dislodged the lateral members holding the 
stringers and the deck began falling into the Sound. This decreased the 
torsional. resistance of the bridge and it did not have the capacity to 
dissipate the energy which was building up. As a result the amplitude 
continued to increase until most of the main span had collapsed. 
The initial cause of the failure was the slipping of the diagonal 
guys. The results following were unavoidable as the forces became too 
great. The structure was very much affected by the wind forces due to 
its slender proportions combined with solid stiffening girders. 
The problem of oscillation caused by wind forces was not new. 
Several bridges in the past have had problems due to lack of stiffening 
or rigidity (62). The problems seemed to be solved with the use of heavy 
stiffening trusses. 
The first suspension bridge was designed and built by James Finley 
in 1801. This bridge had a 70 ft. span with truss type stiffening girders 
and wrought iron suspension. 
The stiffening truss idea was later disregarded in the design and 
construction of a chain cable suspension bridge in Great Britain in 1817 
with a 448 ft. span, but it was wrecked six months later because of the 
lack of stiffening against vertical motion. Another suspension bridge 
designed by the same man suffered failure in 1823 and again in 1836 due 
to the identical problem. Thus, the importance of stiffening was brought 
out by failures and should have been recognized. 
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In 1838 there was a partial failure of the Montrose Bridge built in 
1828-29. It had a suspended roadway 26 ft. wide and a span of 412 feet. 
It was suspended by four chains, a pair vertically above each other on 
each side of the roadway. It had a lightweight railing along each side 
only to serve as a railing and not for the purpose of stiffening. A por-
tion of the center span was lost during a strong wind while witnesses 
watched the undulating motion of the deck. 
The Menai Straits Bridge built in Wales in 1826 by Thomas Telford 
had a span of 550 feet. The deck was suspended by four wrought iron 
cables and had very little stiffening. A month after its completion a 
heavy gale caused considerable motion in the chains and roadway which 
resulted in breaking of several suspender rods and floor beams. The 
motion described by witnesses was recognized as being similar to that of 
the Tacoma Narrows Bridge and being of two waves with very little vertical 
motion, if any, at the center of the span. Repairs and some means of 
strengthening was made but in 1836 during a severe storm the deck was 
reported to have amplitudes of 8 ft. at the quarter points with very 
little damage. The bridge, however, received additional damage in 1839. 
The most remarkable parallel to the Tacoma Narrows failure was that 
of the Wheeling Bridge in West Virginia in 1854. This bridge had adopted 
the use of wire cables for suspension. It was built by Colonel Charles 
Ellet, Jr., in 1847-48 over the Ohio River. It had a span of 1010 ft. 
and a roadway of 17 feet. It had ten cables of 550 No. 10 iron wires. 
During a strong wind in 1854 the bridge collapsed in much the same way as 
the Tacoma Narrows Bridge according to past records. The deck was said 
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to have lifted almost as high as the towers at times with half of the 
floor being nearly reversed. The final result of that action was a fall 
into the Ohio River below. It was following this failure that the stif-
fening truss again came to be used. 
At about the same time of the Wheeling Bridge failure an 825 ft. 
railroad and highway bridge was being built across the Niagara gorge. 
It was of double deck construction with a railroad on the upper deck and 
the lower deck for horse drawn vehicles. It had a truss or support be-
tween the two decks and it was discovered that it gave considerable 
stiffening to the bridge. The bridge served well until it was replaced 
in 1899. 
The Niagara Clifton suspension bridge at the mouth of the gorge just 
below the Falls was built in 1867-69 by a Canadian engineer, Samuel Keefer. 
It had a span of 1260 ft. and failed in a wind storm of 74 m.p.h. winds. 
It failed during the night and its action was described by a lone 
traveler as "rocking like a boat in a heavy sea with its deck almost on 
its very edge." The bridge was replaced in 1898 by the famous Honeymoon 
Bridge which was of arch construction and 840 ft. long. The Honeymoon 
Bridge was wrecked by an ice jam in 1938 (88). 
The decline of the popularity of the stiffening truss began with the 
George Washington Bridge in 1931. This was to be of the double deck con-
struction but only the upper deck was constructed first. The truss re-
quired for support between the two decks was also left out. However, the 
bridge behaved very well due to its large dead load and the rigidity was 
considered quite satisfactory. 
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Following this, bridge engineers began to design narrow, light, 
suspension bridges with shallow girders instead of trusses for stif-
fening. Lateral movement was expected but not vertical undulations. 
The Golden Gate Bridge with a span of 4200 ft. has been observed to have 
great undulations due to very large winds but it has a stiffening truss 
and the most that is expected of the motion is some annoyance to 
travelers. The Whitestone Bridge which is well known for its slenderness 
and grace misbehaves to the point where it is carefully watched. 
The problem which took place with the Tacoma Narrows Bridge was 
not a new problem but one which had been forgotten. Increased stiffness 
against wind action is very important and can be accomplished by several 
methods of design such as stiffening trusses, greater dead load, or guy 
cables. 
Tay Bridge 
The Tay Bridge failure on December 29, 1879 resulted in the loss of 
75 lives (99, 110), This bridge was made up of 85 spans of various types 
of construction and design. The length of the bridge was 10,320 ft. long 
and crossed the Firth of Tay between Newport and Dundee in Scotland. The 
spans were as follows: eleven spans of 245 ft., two of 227 ft., one bow-
string girder of 166 ft., one span of 162 ft., thirteen spans of 145 ft., 
ten of 129 ft. 3 in., eleven of 129 ft., two of 87 ft., twenty-four of 
67 ft. 6 in., three of 67 ft., one of 66 ft., and six of 28 ft. 11 inch. 
The eleven spans of 245 ft. and two of 127 ft. were the spans that col-
lapsed and were located about midway across the channel. The bridge was 
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a railway bridge with one set of tracks. The height of the track above 
the water was approximately 90 feet. 
The bridge consisted of many types of girders and piers. The spans 
which fell into the water were trussed girders 27 ft. in height and the 
roadway was supported on the bottom chord. The piers were made up of 
six vertical steel pipes 15 in. in diameter placed in a hexagonal shape 
and supported on a concrete filled steel cylinder and lined with brick. 
The base was 31 ft. in diameter and extended about 5 ft. above high 
water. The vertical pipes were filled with concrete and were tied to-
gether with diagonal bracing. The height of these piers was 82 ft. from 
the base to the bottom of the truss. 
The remainder of the bridge was intact after the collapse with 
only the thirteen spans mentioned previously having fallen into the 
water. Also the bases of the piers were not damaged which seemed to 
indicate that the vertical members were broken due to a lateral wind 
force. 
The accident occurred about 7:30 p.m. as a passenger train was 
crossing the bridge during a very strong wind measured at about 70 m. p. h. 
with gusts up to 90 m.p.h. A signal was sent to the opposite end of 
the bridge informing them that there was a train crossing. This was a 
standard procedure as there was only one set of tracks. At the time 
that the train proceeded across the bridge it was intact but shortly 
thereafter, as one of the foremen watched, the train suddenly seemed to 
disappear. No word was ever received from the other end of the bridge 
confirming the arrival of the train which indicated that the communication 
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system had been broken and collapse of the bridge was feared. This was 
later confirmed and efforts were made to pick up any survivors but all 
1<ere lost along with the train which was found lying at the bottom of 
the channel. 
Possibly an important factor in the collapse was the interruption 
of the construction by the death of the first contractor. The original 
design of the piers was revised by the next contractor and required a 
much smaller base. Also it was impossible to find a firm rock footing 
for one of the piers so the spans were increased, thus requiring one less 
pier. 
Another factor which played a part in the failure was the ratio of 
the width of the pier to the height as compared to other structures of 
similar construction but of less exposed conditions. Also the Tay 
Bridge had comparably longer spans. It was thought that had the original 
design been carried out and not revised by the new contractor the bridge 
would have been structurally sound. 
The wind pressure was determined to be about 40 lbs. per sq. ft. on 
the exposed surface areas of the bridge. This pressure corresponds to 
a wind velocity of 80 to 90 m.p.h. It was felt that the bridge was not 
properly designed for such a force. Calculations made by a London 
engineering firm showed that the bridge as revised could not resist a 
wind pressure of greater than 30 lbs. per sq. foot. Had the design been 
made according to the received American practice it would have resisted 
the force of any storm. 
The Baird of Inquiry, who investigated the collapse, placed the 
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blame mainly on Mr. Bouch, the original designer, and stated that the 
bridge was badly designed, badly constructed and badly maintained and 
that its downfall was due to defects in the structure which would sooner 
or later bring it down. This meant disgrace and professional ruin for 
Mr. Bouch. 
In those days there were no British Standard Specifications regarding 
the wind pressures to be used in bridge design. The wind pressure of 
12 lb. per sq. ft. used in the design of the Tay Bridge was considered 
very inadequate. 
The cause of the collapse was in part due to inadequate lateral 
wind bracing and failure of cast-iron lugs which connected the bracing 
to the cast-iron posts of the pier. The design and construction of the 
piers were severely criticized having been modified from the original 
design. The revision assumed solid rock and this rock did not even 
exist. 
The fabricating of the cast-iron columns for the piers was under 
very poor supervision and blowholes in the columns were fi lied with a 
substance known as Beaumont's Egg which could be made to match the 
cast-iron perfectly. This, of course, weakened the columns. The sub-
stance was made up of beeswax, fiddler's rosin, very fine iron borings 
and lamp black. Many columns, which were honeycombed and filled with 
Egg, were shipped to the bridge site. The inspection of the foundry was 
left wholly up to the contractors which was, of course, a great mistake 
on the part of Mr. Bouch. 
Mr. Bouch lost his desire to go on living after the accident and 
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died only a few months later at an age of 58. His hair turned white 
overnight as a total of 95 lives were lost, 20 during the construction 
and 75 as a result of the collapse. A black cloud seen~d to hang over 
the construction of this bridge because the first contractor died before 
completion of the contract, the second went insane and died, the third 
was ruined by the collapse and the resident engineer under Bouch de-
veloped paralysis from which he never recovered and which he had said 
was the result of his anxiety about the bridge. 
It was felt at the time that the reason for the poor design was 
mistaken economy, with the great number of pier foundations in 30 to 
35 ft. of water and with very rapid tidal currents the cost would have 
been considerably greater if the original design had been followed. It 
seems incredible that anyone would put economy ahead of the value of 
many human lives. 
The lessons learned in the Tay Bridge disaster were remembered when 
the Forth Bridge was designed a few years later and the Tay Bridge was 
also rebuilt. The use of cast-iron was not considered in the rebuilding 
of the Tay Bridge nor in the Forth Bridge. The piers of the new Tay 
Bridge were built as shown in Figure 5. 
Moenchenstein Bridge 
On Sunday, June 14, 1891 about 500 people from Basel, Switzerland 
were traveling by train to Moenchenstein, which was only about three 
miles away. The train was very heavily loaded, consisted of twelve 
different vehicles and required two engines. When the train was one-
fourth mile from its destination it crossed the Birs River by way of a 
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Figure 5. Pier of rebuilt Tay Bridge (99) 
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single track truss bridge which collapsed under the weight of the loaded 
train (18, 55, 76). There were 74 lives lost and some 200 injuries. The 
vehicles which were completely destroyed contained 266 seats, all of 
which were occupied. 
The bridge was of the truss type with a simple span of 138 ft., and 
divided into six panels. The width between trusses was 15 ft. and had a 
height of 20 feet. 
The bridge was designed by a well known bridge designer in 1874 and 
it was hard to realize that such an error could have been made to cause 
such a disaster. Following the accident, the designer did not want to 
accept any of the responsibility for the design although his signature 
was on the plans. He also was the contractor who built the bridge. The 
design was a complete alteration of one originally designed by a prominent 
Swiss engineer. The original design was an arched span of 143 feet. 
It was quite a common practice in those days for the contractors to 
actually design a structure from sketches and load diagrams supplied 
them by engineers. The contracting party would be required to sign the 
plans and be responsible for any problems which WClllld arise as a direct 
result of the design. 
During the years following the completion of the bridge, it became 
evident that trains were getting larger and an investigation took place 
to determine its load capacity. It was found that the trusses were 
capable of carrying the customary loads as the design stresses were very 
low at 8500 psi. The floor system, however, was found to be deficient 
in strength and changes were made. 
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One factor which accounts for the great loss of life was the poor 
construction of the passenger cars above the lower running framework. 
As some of the passenger cars fell through the bridge, others were pulled 
in and with the forward momentum seemed to fall directly on top of the 
forward cars. The coupling gears also ..ere considered weak which ac-
counted for the cars literally flying through the air individually and 
dropping on top of those first to hit the river. There had been seven 
cars, four of which were passenger cars with 250 passengers, piled to-
gether in one large heap of wreckage. The statement was made that had 
the train been an American made train such a heavy loss of life would 
have been practically impossible due to the superior construction of its 
vehicles. The couplings of European rolling stock were compared to 
clay-pipe stems. 
The cause of the accident was not attributed to a derailment as no 
signs of any wheelmarks were made on the ties. There was no sign of 
anything wrong until the bridge suddenly gave way, according to those 
who survived the accident. 
It was determined with much certainty that the initial fracture 
occurred at the end panel at which point the locomotives had reached 
after passing over the bridge. The fracture could not have occurred at 
the center of the span because that had already been subjected to heavier 
loads. The chords at the center were stressed much higher than those at 
the ends and the lower chord had the same cross-section area throughout 
its length. In fact, strips of metal had been added to the lower chord 
near the abutments but were discontinued within one panel length. This 
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was done as a part of the "beefing up" for greater load capacity but it 
would be expected that any additional material would have been added at 
the center of the lower chord. 
According to two Swiss technical experts who were selected to report 
on the disaster, some of the design errors arrived at were: the thick-
ness of the web of the lower chord was insufficient; there were too many 
rivets around the joints at the connection of the lower chord to the ties 
and struts which weakened the webs; and the eccentric fastening of the 
ties and struts to the chords. The material of the structure was of a 
variable nature and not sufficient for the design loads. The angles 
which tied the plates of the chords together were of poor quality with 
low ductility. The webs of the floor beams and stringers were also very 
inferior. 
Vibration was also considered a major factor in the collapse of the 
bridge. The diagonal strut at the center of the bridge was designed only 
for tension which is correct with a static load at midspan but during 
the passing of a moving load the vibration set up in the span caused 
this member to go into compression. This vibration could also be in-
creased due to the skew of the bridge which would cause like panels to 
deflect at different times and cause bending in the structure. The 
struts near the center of the span were overstressed when a compressive 
load, equal to the tensile load for which they were designed, was added. 
The cause of the failure was finally explained as follows: the 
motion of the train as it neared the center of the bridge caused a 
buckling of the sixth strut bowing it outward. This would result in a 
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settling of the truss and overloading of other struts. The struts near 
the abutment gave way and the one truss collapse was follo"'9d immediately 
by the other. 
The main cause was the weak struts near the middle of the span 
which caused overloading of the others under vibrations. Other causes 
were the poor quality of the material and the eccentric connection of the 
ties and struts. 
Tar des Viaduct 
The failure of the Tardes Viaduct in France took place during 
erection on January 26, 1884 (108). This viaduct was to span the Tardes 
Valley near Evoux, France as an important link in the railroad from 
Montlucon to Eygurande. The depth of the gorge below the rail was 
300 ft. and the length of the structure required to span the gorge was 
821 feet. The plan was for a three span bridge with the center span 
being 328 ft. and the two end spans of 227.8 feet. The two piers were 
to be of granite construction of quite an enormous size. One pier was 
to be 195.6 ft. in height and the other 157.4 ft. both with an area at 
the top of 14 1 -9" x 26'-3". Evidently no steel reinforcing of any type 
was considered and its use was probably unknown at that time. 
The term "granite" of which the piers were to be built, appears to 
indicate a form of concrete according to actual photographs taken at the 
site of the collapse. 
The deck was supported by two trusses below which were 18 ft. apart 
and 27 ft. deep. The trusses were made up of riveted lattice with bars 
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at 45° and crossing each other five times in each panel. 
The great height of the structure above the bottom of the gorge 
required a great amount of falsework for the erection. It was decided 
by the engineers that a method of launching from one of the approaches 
would be more economical. The launching of such long spans, as the 
328 ft. across the center span, was the greatest ever attempted up to 
that time. 
The approaches at both ends of the bridge were curved with rock 
projecting upward on both sides of the approach. In order to make room 
for the erection of the truss, a considerable amount of rock excavation 
was necessary. 
Because of the great center span a method of reducing the open 
distance was accomplished by building a scaffolding at the far pier over-
looking the gorge. This projected out 33 ft. over the gorge. Also a 
false truss was added unto the end of the center span proper of 98.4 
feet. The open span WdS now only 197 feet. It is not quite clear as 
to the advantage of the 98.4 ft. addition to the end of the center portion 
prior to the launch beyond the first pier unless it was of some lighter 
construction. According to the diagram it appears to be of the same 
construction as the rest of the truss. 
The launching was accomplished by a mechanism on top of the pier 
consisting of a set of rollers 21 in. in diameter. The mechanism was 
constructed in a manner such that the vertical position of the rollers 
would be automatically adjusted by any irregularity of the bottom of the 
chord and deflection of the truss. 
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At the time of the accident the truss had been launched to a point 
174 ft. beyond the pier leaving only 121 ft. remaining to reach the 
scaffolding on the opposite pier. A violent wind occurred during the. 
night and caused the destruction of all the truss beyond the abutment, 
a length of 433 ft. and 450 tons. Only that which was erected on the 
approaches remained intact. No one was at the site to witness the col-
lapse. 
The most probable theory of the cause of the failure was that the 
horizontal force of the wind produced oscillation of the projecting truss 
and produced lateral movement at the launching mechanism. There were .no 
restraints against lateral movements between the launching mechanism and 
the top of the pier which was regarded as a faulty part of the design. 
Calculations were made in an attempt to determine the wind velocity 
needed to move the bridge laterally at the pier. Ily using a coefficient 
of friction of 0.20 and the weight of the truss a wind force of 35 lb. 
per sq. ft. would have been sufficient to overcome the frictional force. 
The exposed area of the truss was a minimum when considering the wind to 
act perpendicular to the bridge and would be greater if the wind acted 
obliquely. 
It is a we 11 known fact that a wind force causes an uplift on a 
bridge thereby decreasing the horizontal force required to overcome the 
friction. 
The final decision was that the engineers erred in not taking pre-
cautions to guard against and to control this lateral motion. It was 
assumed that lateral displacement began when the wind force reached 
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about 30 lbs. per sq. foot. This is not an unusual wind and it is dif-
ficult to understand the reasoning of the design engineers in not re-
quiring some means of restraint against lateral movement during launch-
ing. 
Summary 
A discussion of bridge failures in this report shows that errors 
in design are the cause of some very major failures and, in most cases, 
the thought arises as to why these failures cannot be prevented. The 
disastrous failures, of course, are the most disturbing due to the great 
loss of life and the great cost. The following causes of failure in 
this chapter are: correct design given too little importance when de-
signing a very critical part of a structure, dynamic effects disregarded, 
lack of sufficient knowledge regarding the effects of wind forces on 
a structure, revision of original design with too great an emphasis on 
economics, and ignoring the effects of increasing live loads beyond the 
design loading. 
Second Narrows Bridge: 
There were 18 lives lost as a result of this failure which took 
place during construction in 1956 (61, 74, 92). The cause of the col-
lapse was due to failure of a network of steel grillage supporting a 
temporary pier required for a 345 ft. cantilever. 
The design of the steel grillage was faulty and had been dis-
covered in the design office of the Dominion Bridge Company prior to 
the collapse but it was evidently considered unimportant. 
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Lincoln Highway Bascule: 
This was a relatively new bridge and collapse of one leaf took 
place in 1928 when the concrete counterweight fell from its supports 
above the roadway (2, 8, 43, 51, 52). The board appointed to investi-
gate the collapse reported that the counterweight towers were over-
stressed during operation of the leaves and that an old break was ob-
served in one tower leg of the collapsed portion. There were very high 
stresses caused by dynamic action during starting and stopping opera-
tion. The designer was held responsible for the collapse. 
Tacoma Narrows Bridge: 
The failure of the Tacoma Narrows suspension bridge in 1940 was 
very dramatic and probably the most remembered bridge failure by people 
living today (36, 56, 62, 75, 98, 104). It was a very costly failure but 
fortunately there were no lives lost. 
The bridge had a suspended main span of 2800 ft. and was adequately 
designed for the live loads and dead load. The error was in the design 
for aerodynamic forces to which the bridge was subjected during wind 
velocities. The bridge was considered too flexible for its great span 
lengths in comparison to other large suspension bridges. It did not have 
sufficient dead load as a result of its narrow roadway. The effect of 
the wind on the stiffening girders was too great, thus causing the 
snaking action which eventually led to collapse. 
Tay Bridge: 
The failure of a portion of this very well known bridge took place 
in 1879 with the collapse of thirteen spans and the loss of 75 
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lives (99, 110). The total length of the bridge was 10,320 ft. and made 
up a total of 85 spans. The bridge was used to cross the Firth of Tay 
in Scotland. The collapse took place during a severe wind storm and 
while a passenger train was traveling across the bridge. The height of 
the track above the water was about 90 feet. 
The cause of the collapse was due to a change in the design of the 
piers by a new contractor following the death of the original contractor. 
Also, there was faulty material used in the vertical steel supports of 
the piers. Flaws in the steel were covered up with a material which 
could not be distinguished from the actual steel. 
Moenchenstein Bridge: 
This was a disaster which took the lives of 74 passengers on a 
train loaded with about 500 passengers (18, 55, 76). The tragedy took 
place in 1891 near Basel, Switzerland when a truss bridge collapsed 
under the strain of the loaded train. 
The cause of the failure was due to inadequacy of the bridge to 
carry the live loads which had increased over the years. The great loss 
of life was attributed in part to the poor construction of the passenger 
coaches, which literally resulted in a heap of burning rubble at the 
bottom of the gorge. 
Tardes Viaduct: 
This failure took place in France in 1884 during erection with no 
loss in lives (108). 
An erection procedure which consisted of launching the bridge from 
one pier to the next was attempted because of an enormous amount of 
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falsework required. A system of rollers was constructed at the top of 
the first pier but the designer neglected to provide sufficient lateral 
support. 
The collapse took place when 174 ft. of the bridge had been launched 
beyond the first pier. A relatively strong wind forced the truss and 
the launching mechanism off the top of the pier. 
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FAILURES DUE TO INADEQUATE INSPECTION 
General 
There are four bridge failures summarized in this report which were 
a direct result of inadequate inspection by responsible and competent 
persons. 
Careful inspection during construction is very essential. If a 
bridge is constructed in a faulty manner much of the care placed in the 
design is lost. An inspector is probably the most important person in-
volved in the construction of a structure although this importance is 
often overlooked. Confidence is often placed in the honesty of the 
contractor which does not always result in the best workmanship. 
An inspector must have close contact with the building contractor 
at all times. He must insist on good workmanship and discuss methods of 
solving problems as they arise. He must also try to .naintain communica-
tion among personnel. 
An inspector should be aware of design procedures. Conversely it 
would be ideal for the designer to be familiar with actual construction 
procedures. 
It is hoped that the reader will gain some knowledge of the impor-
tance of adequate inspection by the summary which follows. 
First Quebec Bridge 
The Quebec Bridge over the St. Lawrence River failed during erection 
on August 29, 1907 with the loss of 74 lives (58, 69, 80, 85, 95, 100). 
This bridge was the largest of its type and was of the truss cantilever 
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type with a suspended center portion (see Figure 6). 
The river was about a half mile wide at the site and 200 ft. deep 
at mid channel. The span of 1800 ft. was to be the longest up to that 
time. The total length of the bridge was 3240 ft. being made up of the 
center suspended span with a length of 675 ft., the two cantilever arms 
562 ft. 6in. each, the two anchor arms 500 ft. each and two approach 
spans of 220 ft. each. The clearance above high water was to be 150 feet. 
The two main towers rose to a height of 400 ft. above high water. This 
was a gigantic structure for its time and was unequaled by any other 
bridge. As an example of the great size of members, a cross-section of 
a compression member was 4'-6" x 5'-6". The structure was, in general, 
pin connected. The bridge provided for two railway tracks, two street 
car tracks, two roadways and two footways. It was an important link in 
the Canadian railway system. 
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The initial planning for the bridge began in 1852 when the citizens 
of Quebec advocated construction of the bridge across the St. Lawrence 
River for communication purposes between the Maritime Provinces and the 
United States. Otherwise communication was restricted by freezing of the 
river. Plans were prepared for a suspension bridge but the construction 
did not come to be a reality. 
In 1887 the Quebec Bridge Company was given authority to build a 
bridge but due to a lack of funds it was postponed until 1903. In that 
year the Quebec Bridge Company was assured of financial assistance by 
the Canadian government by an act of the Canadian Parliament which de-
clared the bridge to be for the general advantage of Canada. The con-
tract for construction was awarded to the Phoenix Bridge Company of 
Phoenixville, Pa., on June 19, 1903. 
In February of 1899 the Phoenixville Bridge Company submitted a 
plan which was signed by Mr. Hoore, the Chief Engineer of the Quebec 
Bridge Company, following the approval and recommendation of Mr. Cooper, 
a prominent bridge engineer who had been chosen by the Quebec Bridge 
Company to act as consultant. The design was revised by Mr. Cooper from 
a 1600 ft. center span to 1800 ft. as a result of poor foundation material. 
Mr. Cooper was very much interested in the project because he was at the 
age of retirement and it seemed a rewarding way to complete his career. 
His duties were to examine, correct and approve the plans submitted and 
prepared by the contractor, and to advise Mr. Hoore when requested. There 
were personality conflicts between these two men as Mr. Hoore felt he 
should be chief engineer in charge of erection of the bridge. Instead 
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he was made resident engineer of erection. Everyone seemed to have more 
respect for the advice of Mr. Cooper and he waa given the complete 
responsibility for the project. His word was final and not liable for 
alteration by anyone. Mr, Cooper made decisions with absolute honesty 
and was uninfluenced by other parties involved. The conflicting feelings 
between Mr. Hoare and Mr. Cooper probably had some influence on the great 
tragedy. 
The south cantilever was nearly completed at the time of the collapse 
and work had begun on the north cantilever. A huge traveler de.rrick was 
used on the erection, the weight of the traveler being 1100 tons. It 
was of sufficient height for work to be done on the highest portion of 
the 315 ft. tower. At the time of the accident the large traveler was be-
ing dismantled to be used on the north cantilever. A smaller traveler of 
250 tons was to continue with the work on the south cantilever. At the 
time of the collapse of the cantilevered portion the smaller traveler 
was erecting the suspended portion and was 751 ft. from the main pier. 
The larger traveler, with about 800 tons of it left to be removed, was at 
the ninth panel or about 500 ft. out from the pier. It was questionable 
as to the added weight being the cause of the failure and that the work 
should have stopped until the larger traveler had been completely re-
moved. The Phoenix Bridge Company made calculations as to the stresses 
at the time of the failure and found that the stresses in the chords were 
less than 20,000 psi, which was less than that for which it was designed. 
The cantilever portion was designed on the basis of the larger traveler 
being used to erect the suspended span. 
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The bridge seemed to fall vertically with no side motion. The 
cantilever sloped towards the water until the tower's base slipped off 
the pier tops. It then fell directly and immediately into the river. 
The thought seemed reasonable that the collapse began with the failure 
of a compression member in the lower chord just south of the main tower 
in the anchor portion because of the position of the wreckage and the 
completeness of the collapse. There was no breakage of any member of the 
top eyebars and it was finally discovered under the wreckage that the 
bottom chord member A9L of the second panel south of the tower was 
buckled very critically (see Figures 7 and 8). It was later reported 
that this compression chord had deflected about 2 in. prior to the col-
lapse but nothing was done to correct it. None of the other chords had 
been found to be buckled which threw a great deal of suspicion on 
member A9L. It was bent in the shape of an S and the question arose as 
to why would a member fail when stressed much less than that for which it 
was designed. The dead load produced a stress of only about 15,000 psi 
and the live load of the two travelers was less than that of the un-
completed flooring had it been in place. The total stress in the com-
pression member A9L was computed as about 18,000 psi and a temporary 
stress of even 24,000 psi would be considered safe. 
The deflection of the member was discovered about three days prior 
to the collapse. A careful watch was made of it for the next two days 
and no more deflection was noticed but the latticing began to show signs 
of severe stress. A telegram was sent by the inspector in charge of 
erection, Mr. McClure, to Mr. Cooper. Mr. Cooper immediately wired the 
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Figure 7. Member A9L of First Quebec Bridge (57) 
Phoenix Bridge Company and told them that no more weight should be added 
to the bridge until this problem had been solved, but action was delayed 
and the bridge fell into the river along with 85 men, 11 of which were 
rescued. 
The compression member A9L was constructed of four massive plate 
webs each made up of four rolled plates, stitch-riveted together to form 
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Figure 8. Part stress diagram of First Quebec Bridge (57) 
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one built up plate nearly 4 in. thick. These four webs were bound to-
gether by latticing so as to act as one member. The outside dimensions 
of the member were 5 '-7 1/2" x 4' -6 5/8 11 • The member was reported to have 
had a kink in one of the inner webs before it left the fabricating shop. 
The member was also involved in a railway accident during shipment to the 
site. It was reported that the member had been repaired with excellent 
workmanship. It is very improbable that the workers would have placed 
the member in its position in the bridge had it not been straight. The 
length of the member was 57 ft. and if the deflection of 2 in. existed 
before erection it would have been noticed and rejected. The resident 
engineer said the deflection had always been in the member and the de-
flection was not caused by overstress. This was not the feeling of the 
other responsible men on the job. Every member was inspected by several 
people and it is not probable that it would go unnoticed in such an 
important and massive structure. 
It was felt that the method of latticing the web plates together in 
the member was poor. Near the ends of the member were cover plates used 
to tie the web plates together and it was demonstrated in the wreckage 
that this was an excellent means of holding the plates together. The 
amount of material in the stiffening lattice that binds the parts of a 
member together ought to be in proportion to the parts which they join 
together. Theoretically very little material would be needed to hold the 
compression members together under direct loading but under practical 
conditions this is often untrue. The plates must be free from any ini-
tial strains and this is impossible due to shearing and punching of rivet 
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holes along with riveting. 
Another fact placing more suspicion on the member A9L was that the 
member A9R, directly across in the right truss member, was also badly 
bent where none of the other bottom chord members were damaged as such. 
This appears to have resulted in the transfer of the load to the right 
truss as soon as the member A9L began to yield. This would lead to the 
feeling that other members of the bridge were stressed somewhat higher 
than expected. 
Mr. Cooper was reported to have complained about the capability of 
the chief engineer hired by the Quebec Bridge Company, the designers of 
the bridge. He also felt the engineer representing the Phoenix Bridge 
Company, the contractors, was not qualified for his responsible position 
connected with the erection of such an important structure. 
The practice at that time regarding bridge design was for the con-
tractor in charge of the fabrication of the bridge to make up the working 
plans. As a rule, no engineer could afford to maintain a staff of such 
character and no corporation would listen to a fee that would cover any 
such expense. The engineer supplies the fabricator with the loading, 
both dead load and live load, the stresses in the members and the areas 
required to resist these stresses. The fabricator then builds the members 
from the stress sheet (see Figure 8). 
Mr. Cooper believed that if both the Phoenix Bridge Company and the 
Quebec Bridge Company would have had responsible representatives who were 
qualified and experienced for such an important job the work would have 
been stopped in time and the bridge probably saved or at least the 
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workers would have been removed from the bridge. Mr. Cooper's inspector 
reported to him in person about the bent compression member and action 
was at once taken to notify the contracting firm to stop immediately, but 
word was received too late. He believed that the member A9L could have 
been prevented from further deflection with about three hours work and 
$100. 
The testimony of the chief engineer of the Phoenix Bridge Company 
revealed that the matter of the deflection of member A9L was seriously 
considered by the engineer, shop officials, and inspectors but decided 
that the deflection could not be due to an overstress as the stress was 
only about three-fourths of the design stress. The resident engineer on 
the bridge, Mr. Hoore, informed them that the member had been bent for a 
long time and the erection continued without waiting for advice which 
they all agreed was the correct thing to do. At about that instant 
the bridge fe 11. 
Also a contributing factor was the design of the bridge using as-
sumed weights of members and due to haste in completing the final plans 
the design calculations were not revised using actual weights which were 
20 per cent higher than the assumed. Mr. Cooper neglected to make the 
check in the weights assuming it had already been done by the designer. 
The problem was discovered when the members were actually weighed in the 
fabricating shop and erection had already begun. This error accounted 
for the apparently low stresses of the individual members as compared 
with those in the specifications. The actual stresses were, therefore, 
much greater. 
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The matters of weights of members was discussed with Mr. Cooper by 
the designer and it was decided that the bridge would be safe as designed 
and that erection should continue. The actual stress in the critical 
bottom chord member A9L was finally calculated at a compressive stress 
of 29,700 psi. 
The Royal Commissioners who were investigating the collapse felt 
that the structure should have been condemmed when such an error was 
discovered but undoubtedly Mr, Cooper felt that the extreme conditions 
used as criteria in the design would not actually exist. 
There was no doubt as to the primary responsibility of the Phoenix 
Bridge Company which made the designs. Also secondary responsibility 
should lie with Mr. Cooper as the consultant who approved the designs 
and plans. Each party here involved had admitted reliability to some 
extent on the other party. Some aspects of the design were probably 
considered too lightly by one party due to its confidence in the other 
party but this does not relieve either from their responsibilities. 
The correct way of constructing any structure is for each party 
involved to have a qualified inspector on the job and to work together 
and check each other's errors. Also each may have a different view of 
some particular problem. The advice of people involved with the actual 
construction and who are well experienced should be well accepted by the 
designer or the inspectors. This is not always the case. 
Regarding the design of this bridge there had been no precedent set 
as there had never before been such an enormous structure built. The 
members were made up with latticing which had been compared to that of 
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smaller structures. When the members were fabricated the workmen were 
impressed with the lack of stiffness and rigidity and the president of 
the company suggested this to the designing engineer but the idea was 
rejected as unimportant. 
The primary cause of failure was determined to be the member A9L in 
the lower chord which showed signs of distress during erection but its 
condition was not thought important by some of the officials at the site 
because the member was apparently operating at a stress below that for 
which it was designed. This points to the fact that had not the allow-
able working stresses been so high, 24,000 psi, the condition of the 
member would have been given more consideration. The fact that the 
structure actually failed under a unit-stress, which was considered a 
safe working load, indicated that deficiencies in the design of the 
failing members were to be placed ahead of the high unit-stresses as 
the chief cause of the disaster. 
In 1908 the Canadian Government decided to assume the responsibility 
for providing a bridge at this site as an important link in the Trans-
continental Railway which was then under construction. A board of three 
engineers was appointed to act under the Minister of Railways. The 
board was to decide whether or not any part of the collapsed bridge could 
be re-used and construction continued or if a totally new design should 
be made. The Board decided that no use could be made of the existing 
plans, specifications or material. Even though the north cantilever 
was well along in construction it was found that the bottom of the pier 
was 46 ft. above bedrock and they recommended a totally new pier 57 ft. 
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farther out from shore. 
Alternative plans were submitted by various steel companies and the 
one decided on was the one submitted by the St. Lawrence Bridge Company 
as seen in Figure 9. There was much disagreement within the Board and 
finally after several resignations and new appointments there had been 
eleven different men involved in and responsible in the decision of the 
Second Quebec Bridge contrary to only one, Mr. Cooper, in the First 
Quebec Bridge. The same procedure was followed regarding the design by 
the contractor and not by an engineering firm. This procedure was quite 
common and followed often in design of large bridges. 
The general plan was for a similar type of bridge with bottom chord 
members being in a straight line rather than in a curve pattern as in the 
first bridge. The bottom chord section contained four webs, but con-
sisted of twice the cross-sectional area. 
Figure 9. The Second Quebec Bridge, as built (69) 
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Palm Beach Arch Bridge 
A bridge consisting of thirteen concrete arched spans, a steel swing 
span and a causeway at each end was the site of a collapse on December 29, 
1922 at Lake Worth between Palm Beach and West Palm Beach, Florida (34, 
117). The total length of the bridge was to be 1,885 ft. with a 30 ft. 
roadway and cantilevered 5 ft. sidewalks on each side of the bridge 
making the total width 40 ft. out to out. 
The arches were barrel arches which were being filled with sand 
pumped up from the bottom of the lake. The filling was nearly completed 
at the time of the collapse. In fact the collapse took place on Decem-
ber 29 and the bridge was to be opened to traffic on January 1. This 
collapse is quite typical in that many failures take place during con-
struction and usually near the completion of the bridge. Placing the 
final material adds greatly to the dead load of the structure at a rapid 
rate and can cause unequal loading conditions. This, however, was not 
considered the cause of this failure. 
Three spans of 63 ft. fell into the lake along with two piers and 
the falsework for the arches. The three spans which collapsed were those 
nearest the opening for the swing span. The failure of arches or 
especially of spandrel-filled barrel arches was practically unknown at 
that time and a detailed investigation was called for by the design 
engineers who were also carrying out the supervision of construction. 
The report was made public on January 9 and contained the following 
results of the investigation. 
The arch spans were 69 ft. with a clear span of 63 feet. The pier 
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at the swing span opening was 19 ft. thick and the other piers varied 
from 9 ft. to 9 ft. 6 in. with the tops of the piers being 2 ft. below 
the surface of the water . 
The arches were of reinforced concrete barrel construction with 
12 in. walls at roadway level and 24 in. walls at the bottom where they 
rested on the pier top. There was no vertical reinforcement in the 
piers and there was no bond between the piers and the arch walls. 
The piers were constructed in sheet-pile cofferdams which were 
cleaned out to rock. The concrete was placed under water by use of a 
tremie and the concreting was not continuous. The rock on which the 
piers were placed was a soft coral rock and sheet piling could be driven 
right through it. 
Following the collapse the three arches along with the two piers 
were completely gone from view below the water surface. Part of one 
pier was intact below the water surface but the other pier had completely 
disappeared. 
The concrete was inspected and it was revealed that too much sand 
had been used and also some very poor and large aggregate. The concrete 
could, at places, be crushed between the finger tips. 
The question arose as to the amount of care taken in investigating 
the foundation material. The thickness of this rather soft rock was 
quite variable and in places it was not more than one or two feet thick. 
Sometimes the rock would disappear completely. The rock had been pene-
trated by pine piles which indicated the poor quality of the rock. 
There was also doubt as to the quality of the pier concrete because 
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of the manner in which it was placed. The absence of vertical reinforc-
ing also indicated structurally unsound piers. 
The cause of the collapse was due to the failure of the one pier 
that completely disappeared and the actual investigation of that pier 
could not be accomplished. The investigation showed that as a result of 
noncontinuous placing of concrete under water there was a considerable 
amount of soft and defective material between the adjacent pourings. 
There was no aggregate and the soft material was unable to carry any 
loads. Some places consisted of very large voids which resulted from 
the washing away of this soft material. 
The cause of the collapse was established as a combination of the 
following: 
1. The unusually light type of design and reinforcement 
2. The poor quality of the concrete at critical points 
3. The doubtful nature of the foundation strata, which should have 
been rigidly developed at each pier over its entire length 
4. The tremie concreting, and discontinuous concreting, in combina-
tion with the omission of vertical reinforcement in the piers. 
The specifications which were to be followed in the construction 
called for removal of any scum or laitance from the surface of the 
preceding pour before beginning the next pour. This requirement was 
completely ignored, Some of the concrete near the top of the pier was 
actually poured in water. It was reported that these operations were 
carried on with the knowledge of the inspector. 
It also was discovered that some of the arches had been constructed 
out of alignment. It was thought possible that the fallen arches also 
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may have been in a position other than that called for in the design. 
The plans and specifications were considered accurate, thus the responsi-
bility for the collapse lies with the contractor and the inspector 
representing the design engineer. 
Attica Bridge 
A bridge consisting of six pratt truss spans over the Wabash River 
was the site of a collapse on Sunday, April 5, 1914 (7, 107). Two spans 
collapsed allowing a passenger engine and three passenger coaches to 
fall 30 feet. Three people were killed and 35 injured, which was sur-
prisingly low. 
The length of the bridge was 1,795 ft. with truss spans varying in 
length from 110 ft. to 156 feet. The collapse occurred at an end span 
and an adjacent span. The accident took place over dry ground otherwise 
many passengers could have drowned. 
The failure was caused directly by an accident to one of the end 
posts on a 110 ft. span, which was one of the end trusses of the bridge. 
This end post had been struck by a derailed freight car prior to the col-
lapse. The impact of the derailed car caused the neutral axis of the end 
post to be displaced outward about 7 1/2 inches. Also there were severe 
splits in the cover plates for a considerable distance parallel to the 
rivet lines. Some of the cracks occurred within the rivet lines. 
The passenger train which fell through the bridge was from Williams-
port, Indiana. Its crew had received word of the damaged bridge and that 
they should proceed very slowly over the bridge at speeds of 3 or 4 m.p.h. 
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When the passenger train reached the approach of the bridge a freight 
locomotive was being used to remove the derailed car from the bridge. 
Apparently the crew took it upon themselves to cross the bridge as the 
bridge did not deflect under the load of the engine being used to clear 
the deck. When the pilot wheels of the locomotive reached the far abut-
ment the span dropped, along with the adjacent end of the second truss. 
The damage to the end post should have been inspected more fully 
and allowable loads determined. The load of the passenger train resulted 
in considerably more stress in the member than that caused by the 
individual freight locomotive. The weakened condition should have 
been apparent and its seriousness realized with immediate suspension 
of traffic. The testing of the bridge with the use of the locomotive 
clearly was endangering the lives of the employees. The load on the 
end post as a result of the freight locomotive was 147,800 pounds and 
that of the passenger train 186,800 pounds. A detailed inspection had 
been ordered following the damage to the end post but apparently the 
bridge seemed to be strong enough and the passenger train proceeded 
across. It had not been established if the crew had received word to 
cross and the responsibility for permitting the bridge to be used in its 
weakened condition could not definitely be placed due to lack of evidence. 
A partial analysis of the stresses in the end post following the 
collapse showed a probable compressive stress of 7,700 psi which is not 
unreasonable. The allowable stress calculated according to the column 
formula, P = 16,000 - 70 l/r was 11,980 psi with 1 being 408 in. and 
r being 7.1 inches. If, however, the end of the post remained fixed in 
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such a way as to cause an eccentricity of 7 1/2 in. an additional fiber 
stress of 11,080 psi could have resulted, This added to that caused by 
direct load could result in a total stress of 18,780 psi which is about 
57 per cent overstress. 
The material otherwise was considered of good quality along with the 
riveting and workmanship. The failure was a direct result of the damaged 
end post but it is not clear where the actual responsibility was placed. 
The attempt to have the damaged bridge inspected by an experienced 
bridge inspector was evident, but the death of the engineman, fireman, 
and an express messenger in the collapse makes it impossible to determine 
if actual word was received for the passenger train to cross the damaged 
bridge. 
Chester River Bridge 
A failure of an unusual type occurred on a bridge over the Chester 
River in Chester, Pa., on the evening of September 10, 1921 (13, 41). 
This could be considered a very minor failure in regard to the damages 
to the bridge, but the cause of the failure requires attention along with 
the fact that 24 lives were lost. 
On this evening on September 10 a crowd of people were gathered on 
a sidewalk cantilevered out from the bridge girder to watch the rescue of 
a boy from the river. The sidewalk suddenly began to slope towards the 
river and 75 people fell into the river, of which 24 drowned. 
The structure was a welded plate girder bridge with a span of 70 
feet. The sidewalk was cantilevered out from the girder a distance of 
12 ft., and supported by brackets made up of angles and connected to a 
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stiffener angle of the girder by gusset plates of 3/8 in. thickness. 
The brackets were 12 ft. center to center. The bracket which failed was 
bolted to the girder stiffener by the gusset plate which was riveted to 
the top angle of the bracket. All the other brackets were connected to 
the girder by gusset plates which were riveted only. This led investiga-
tors to believe that the failed bracket had been under repair at some 
time previously. 
The gusset plate had failed along a vertical line just beyond the 
edge of the girder stiffener. About 8 in. at the top appeared to have 
been an old failure because the fracture was rusty. 
The design of the brackets was considered faulty because of the 
fact that wrought iron had been used for the gusset plate and that the 
rolling grain was vertical. 
The bridge was designed in 1886 and in 1910 a canal boat became 
wedged beneath the bridge and had bent the bracket. The fact as to how 
the bracket was repaired was not considered important. Some said it was 
straightened without removing it from the bridge which is evidenced by 
the fact that the gusset was riveted at the top and bolted to the girder 
stiffener. The courts decided that the county was to be held responsible 
due to poor inspection of the bridge. It was felt that a defect of the 
kind that had obviously existed in the gusset plate should not have gone 
unnoticed by the inspectors. The collapse therefore showed negligence 
on the part of the inspectors. 
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Summary 
It is the purpose of this discussion to remind the reader of the 
great importance of proper inspection both by the owner and by the de-
signer. Inspection is often taken too lightly. It is the final stage 
for a structure to be constructed properly since the early planning 
stages and the drawing board. If this stage is faulty an eraser cannot 
make it correct, 
The following brief summary includes causes of failure due to lack 
of ability and knowledge on the part of the inspector, the inspector 
being aware of faulty workmanship, and lack of maintenance inspection. 
First Quebec Bridge: 
The failure of this bridge, which was being built to span the St. 
Lawrence River, took place in 1907 during erection with the loss of 74 
lives (58, 69, 80, 85, 95, 100), It was a truss cantilever type with a 
suspended center span. 
Failure took place in a compression member of the lower chord of 
an anchor span. Even though unusual deflections were being observed as 
failure was impending, erection was not discontinued due to unqualified 
inspectors at the erection site. The result was the collapse of the 
anchorage span and cantilever. 
Palm Beach Arch Bridge: 
This bridge consisted of thirteen arch spans with a steel swing span 
included (34, 117). Failure of three spans took place in 1922 just 
three days prior to the opening to traffic. 
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C'ause of the collapse was due to use of faulty concrete in the 
piers, discontinuous concreting by use of tremie, insufficient steel 
reinforcement in piers, and inadequate foundation material. These faulty 
construction procedures were all carried out with the knowledge of the 
inspector. 
Attica Bridge: 
This bridge consisted of six Pratt truss spans of which two end 
spans collapsed under the weight of a passenger train in 1914 (7, 107). 
Three persons were killed in the collapse which was a result of a 
damaged end post. A derailment of a railroad car just prior to the col-
lapse caused severe damage to the end post. 
The cause of the accident was determined to be the damaged end post 
but it was not established where the responsibility lay. A qualified 
inspector had been notified but before he could reach the site the train 
proceeded across the bridge. Whether or not the train engineer had 
received word allowing the train to cross was not established due to the 
death of the crew. 
Chester River Bridge: 
This failure consisted of the failure of a cantilevered sidewalk 
on the bridge (13, 41). There were 24 lives lost due to drowning when 
7 5 persons fe 11 into the river. 
One of the brackets which supported the sidewalk failed due to 
a previous accident. It had at one time been repaired but not replaced. 
The fracture at the time of collapse consisted of a rusted break. 
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Lack of inspection was established as the chief cause of the 
disaster. 
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FAILURES DUE TO INADEQUATE CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES 
Four bridge failures are discussed in this report and were a 
direct result of inadequate construction procedures which are closely 
associated with inadequate inspection. Adequate inspection would not 
permit some construction procedures to take place. 
In the past, when truss bridges were quite common, it was often 
found that the erector would add members to a truss or increase the size 
of members to fit the field conditions. As a result the stresses in 
the members would change from those used in the design. 
Often it is found necessary in construction to use methods which 
are different from methods used in the past and may be unfamiliar to the 
contractor. According to specifications an alternative method must be 
approved by the engineer. This, of course, requires the engineer to be 
well experienced with the procedures available. The engineer must, 
however, be truthful in his opinion and knowledge concerning the methods. 
In the following summary various methods of inadequate construction 
are discussed. 
Ashtabula Bridge 
A great tragedy took place on December 29, 1876 when a Pacific 
Express passenger train loaded with 160 passengers fell through a 
bridge and resulted in the death of 92 of its passengers (4, 5, 6). 
The bridge was of the Howe truss type with two tracks being supported 
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on the top chord. It had a single span of 156 ft., was 20 ft. deep 
from lower to upper chord and consisted of twelve panels. It was the 
first Howe truss built of wrought iron instead of wood and was somewhat 
of an experiment. One factor which caused great difficulty and may have 
had something to do with the collapse was the extra dead weight resulting 
from the use of wrought iron instead of the usual wood. 
The train was made up of two engines, four baggage and express 
cars, two ordinary coaches, one smoking car, one palace car and three 
sleepers. The train was traveling from Erie to Ashtabula, Ohio on the 
evening of December 29 and was slowed considerably by a great snowfall. 
When the train arrived at the bridge it was only a few hundred feet from 
the depot and moving about 10 to 12 miles per hour. When the front 
engine came within two panel lengths of the far abutment, the center of 
the bridge apparently began to deflect as reported by the engineer of 
the front engine. He reported hearing a loud crack and as the engine 
was apparently traveling upgrade he opened the throttle. This broke the 
connection and allowed the engine to reach the abutment before the rest 
of the train began to fall. It fell to the bottom of a 75 ft. deep 
gorge. 
It was certainly reasonable to assume that the bridge had sometime 
been subjected to heavier loads than this over its 12 years in opera-
tion. The design load, which was two trains on the bridge simultaneously, 
could have been reached at some time. The matter of low temperatures 
making the iron more brittle was given some consideration but was over-
ruled in that a dynamic blow would have to had taken place, low 
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temperature not being a factor under static load. The only way the bridge 
could have been exposed to a dynamic blow would be if there had been some 
cars derailed and the wheels were striking the cross ties but this was 
not considered to have happened. The matter of brittle fracture result-
ing from low temperatures and chemical analysis was considered almost a 
century ago so this aspect of structural design certainly is not a new 
one. It seems that over this length of time a great deal should be known 
about brittle fracture through experience and experimentation. 
The designer of the bridge was Mr. Tomlinson, an engineer. The 
design was modified by Mr. Stone who was president of the road at the 
time. Mr. Tomlinson was not in agreement with Mr. Stone and refused to 
sign the plans as he did not approve of a wrought iron Howe truss be-
cause of the additional dead load. He thought the bracing should be 
made of larger material and because of the disagreement was fired. 
There were no members in the bridge with a depth greater than 6 in. and 
this was considered too small for the compression members. Even yihen 
supported at the center some of these members were 23 ft. long. 
A civil engineer testified during the inquest that his examination 
of the wreckage showed that all members were heavier than needed except 
for the top chord. He felt the Howe truss pattern was not well adapted 
for heavy iron bridges because it resulted in too many compression 
members which increased the dead load. 
Mr. Tomlinson stated that he had found that some of the diagonal 
bracings were not in their correct position for which they were designed. 
Some of them were out of position by as much as three inches. His 
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feeling about beefing up of the compression members was also felt by 
others. Some of the diagonal members had their ends chipped to make room 
for tension rods which also could have weakened the structure. The 
erection of the bridge was very faulty in that the person responsible and 
in charge was very inexperienced in bridge work. The bridge was under 
the supervision of Mr, Tomlinson until he was dismissed. Mr. Rogers re-
placed him and had never before erected a bridge. The erection was 
faulty in that modifications were made in the field. Mr. Rogers had 
never seen the plans for the bridge. 
Testimony was given by an experienced machinist who had worked on 
the fabrication of the bridge in the shop. He said the bridge was 
assembled on supports and as the formwork under the center of the span 
was removed the bridge began to deflect under its own weight and would 
have collapsed had all the formwork been removed. This defect was kept 
a secret. One reason for the defect was that the beams in the chords 
were placed in the structure so that bending occurred about the weak 
axis. This error was corrected and some additional members added which 
were not included in the original design. This also added to the dead 
weight. 
Another error in its construction was that the structure was not 
long enough to span the distance between abutments which resulted in 
modifications which had not been accounted for in the design. 
Some facts submitted by three civil engineers employed by the Legis-
lative Committee to investigate the Ashtabula disaster were: 
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1. All the tension members had very large factors of safety and 
were well able to sustain all loads that could possibly come 
upon them, 
2. All the compression members were deficient in capacity and 
had very low factors of safety. 
3. The top chord as well as the diagonal braces took part in the 
failure. All had very low factors of safety and failure was 
inevitable . 
The material itself was of superior quality and no weakness was 
found which could not have been discovered and prevented. 
It was quite apparent in the erection of this bridge that members 
were cut, chipped, filed and their lengths changed to make members come 
together. This could result in much different stresses than those for 
which the bridge was designed, This freedom of manipulating members 
seemed to come about by the belief by workmen that a very large factor 
of safety was involved, such as 4 to 6. The actual factor of safety was 
1 1/2 to 2 but with the manner by which members were modified it may have 
been as little as l in some cases. By appreciating a low factor of 
safety, the necessity of good workmanship would be quite apparent to 
those in charge. 
There are various reasons for the collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge. 
The primary one is faulty construction although it was probably strong 
enough for the time at which it was constructed. Trains at that time 
were of considerably less weight. 
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Second Quebec Bridge 
One of the most dramatic bridge failures was the failure of the 
Second Quebec Bridge on September 12, 1916 (3, 11, 12, 22, 38, 97). It 
is believed that only 13 lives were lost in this .accident. The failure 
consisted of the center suspended span (see Figure 9 shown on page 54) 
falling into the St. Lawrence River during its hoisting operation. 
The truss type suspended span was erected at a shallow point of the 
river about three miles below the bridge site called Sillery Cove. At 
low tide the bed of the river was exposed which permitted better working 
conditions. The span, which was 640 ft. long, was erected on piling. 
When the span was ready for transporting to the bridge site, floating 
scows were placed under the span and as the tide rose the span was sup-
ported by the scows. The trip to the site was free of any incidents. 
Meanwhile at the site the cantilevered portion at each end was ready to 
receive the center span. A system of hangar chains was attached to the 
span and as the tide lowered the weight of the span was transferred to 
the cantilevers. 
There were thousands of spectators at the site, many of whom were 
prominent engineers. The jacking process began and proceeded without 
incident for about 15 ft. when suddenly there was a loud report and the 
span fell into the river. The south end of the span seemed to drop first 
as was evidenced by a photograph taken by a newspaper reporter. 
The span had been supported at each of its four corners on rockers 
which had rocker pins both longitudinally and transversely, thus 
performing as a universal joint between the span and the lifting 
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girder (see Figure 10). The lifting girder was then connected to the 
lifting hangars as shown in Figure 11. There seemed to be a possible 
unstable condition here because the point at the connection to the hangar 
chains was at about the same elevation as the universal joint. With the 
truss supported about 4 ft. above this point a small amount of eccentrici-
ty would tend to tip the girder. It was first thought that fracture of 
the rocker casting was the cause. However the dropping of the corner of 
the truss could have caused a sudden thrust and a possible rotation of 
the girder, allowing the one corner of the span to slip off and into the 
river. Every precaution had been taken to keep the span level during the 
jacking. The lifting chains and girders were all in good condition 
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following the accident. The load on each of the rockers was 1,300 tons 
and this great load could account for the loud report preceding the col-
~pH. 
Measurements were taken of the hangar chain at the south end of the 
span and some stretching was observed. The observed stretch in the 
hangar opposite the one near the corner of the truss that first collapsed 
showed that the other rocker carried a load of 60 per cent to 100 per cent 
in excess of its load before collapse. 
The question arose as to the design stresses in the rocker. The 
St. Lawrence Bridge Company, designers of the bridge, furnished the 
board of engineers with calculations used in design of the rockers. The 
design reaction at each corner of the truss was 3,000,000 lb. which in-
cluded 20 per cent impact. There certainly was no impact on the rocker 
at the time of failure. The allowable stress was 20,000 psi in both the 
rockers and the hangars. The question arose as to why the allowable 
stress in the rocker castings could be as great as that in the hangars 
as the factor of safety for the hangars could definitely be established. 
The rockers were not tested prior to erection as the hangars had been. 
The rockers should have had a larger factor of safety due to possibly 
more variable material and a much more irregular stress pattern. The 
hangars had been tested up to failure at a stress of 60,000 lb. 
The rotation of the lifting girder of an amount sufficient to permit 
the span to slip off the rocker had been seen as probable. The rotation 
could have been as little as 5 per cent which could be the angle of 
friction of the rocker on the pin. Many conditions would have had to be 
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accurate to account for no rotation of the lifting girder -- the workman-
ship would have had to be accurate, the lower casting would have had to 
be bolted to the girder correctly, and the girders would have had to 
receive the load of the span correctly at beginning of raising. If the 
span had been moored by guy wires at a location not directly below its 
final position in the bridge and the hoisting chain attached, an eccentric 
moment may have resulted as the tide lowered and the span moved horizontal-
ly to its correct position between the cantilevers. 
Other forces could have been introduced to cause rotation of the 
girder as the south end of the span was 2 ft. higher than the north end. 
Also, a temperature change took place which resulted in about a 2 1/2 in. 
expansion. This would tilt the girder slightly. The two conditions 
combined would tend to aggrevate the moments in the south girder and 
improve that in the north girder as the span was being raised. 
The St. Lawrence Bridge Company accepted full responsibility for the 
accident and began almost immediately to replace the span. There was full 
confidence in the original design and a few minor alterations were made 
to assure that the bridge could not again slip off the rocker unto the 
lifting girder. A lead cushion was substituted for the second pin in 
the rocker casting thus resulting in a much more stable condition. 
The erection progressed very rapidly and smoothly and the first 
crossing was made on October 17, 1917 with the bridge being fully 
completed and accepted by the Canadian government on August 21, 1918. 
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Germany's Frankenthal Bridge 
In August of 1950 the construction was completed on the largest 
welded plate girder bridge in the world at that time (64). The bridge 
site was at Manneheim, Germany across the Rhine River. The construction 
was started in 1939 and the uncompleted bridge failed in December of 1940 
when erection of the main girders was nearly complete. For erection 
sequence see Figure 12. Thirty-six construction workers lost their 
lives in the collapse which was initiated by the carelessness of the 
erection superintendent. 
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Figure 12. Erection sequence of Frankenthal Bridge (64) 
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The original design of the bridge consisted of four lines of con-
tinuous welded plate girders with spans of 482 ft. and 528 feet. The 
girders were 21'-9" deep with webs of from 3/4 to 7/8 in. thick and 
flanges up to 4 ft. wide and 10 1/2 in. thick. The 528 ft. span was 
over the navigational channel and a clear width of 330 ft. was required 
by the navigation authorities which necessitated a cantilever method of 
construction. A balanced section was constructed over the center pier 
as stage 1, this being supported as necessary by temporary piers. The 
482 ft. span had been completed and the other span was cantilevered a 
distance of 370 ft. to a temporary pier. The supporting structure was 
not complete at this time so erection was continued for another 46 feet. 
At this point the deflection of the free end of the girder was about 
6 feet. A jacking process was planned to place the girders on the sup-
porting mechanism of the temporary pier. About 300 tons of dead load 
were added by the 46 ft. extension which had not been anticipated in the 
original design. During the jacking process a large horizontal force 
was created by uneven raising of the jacks. A further eccentricity was 
created by a new angle at which the girders were deflecting. Also 
adding to the eccentricity was the deflection of the pile group of the 
temporary pier. The combination of these horizontal forces caused the 
collapse of the temporary pier and the span yielded at the point of contra-
flexure. 
The wrecked span had to be cleared from the channel with very little 
salvage value. World War II delayed completion of the bridge for nine 
years. 
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Reconstruction of the east span began in 1950 and it was decided to 
use only two girders instead of the four girders in the original design 
(see Figure 13). This resulted in a very complicated and costly transi-
tion and it was decided to cut the floor beams of the western span at 
the centerline. This alteration resulted in a more slender span and 
thereby required lateral bracing between the two girders. 
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The method of erection was at this time considerably different from 
that at the time of collapse. Floating cranes and a sufficient number 
of temporary piers were used which resulted in much shorter cantilever 
portions. 
Spokane River Bridge 
A 250 ft. twin rib concrete arch bridge over the Spokane River in 
Spokane, Washington collapsed during construction of the concrete arch 
ribs on February 6, 1917 (20, 90, 102). Three workmen lost their lives. 
The arch ribs were 6 ft. square in cross-section at the top of the arch 
tapering to 6 ft. x 8 ft. at the abutments. The collapse took place 
without any warning while concrete was being placed. The arches were 
being erected on timber falsework, this being supported on timber piles 
driven to rock in the river bottom. The progress of the construction 
along with falsework details are shown in Figure 14. The point to which 
it was completed before its collapse is also shown. 
The construction was under the supervision of the designer of the 
bridge who, just one week before the collapse, fell off one of the arches 
and drowned. The construe ti on was then supervised by the city engineer. 
The falsework consisted of 18 bents of 7 piles. The bents were 
spaced at 12 feet 4 inches. The falsework was as shown in Figure 14 with 
four lines of longitudinal sway bracing. The sway bracing was supposed 
to be bolted to the piles but instead only one to three spikes were used. 
Many of the piles had not had the bark removed and at least an 8 in. 
spike was necessary to reach through the sway bracing, the bark of the 
Figure 14. 
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pile, and 1 to 2 in. of soft sapwood. This would be a very insecure 
connection. The piles were said to be driven to solid rock but in son-e 
cases it was thought maybe small boulders caused refusal of the pile. 
Where boulders were known the piles were driven off center sometimes as 
much as 3 feet. 
About 30 minutes before the collapse a check was made as to points 
at which concrete drops were made which might cause distortion of the 
falsework. Some concrete drops were as much as 15 ft. vertical. There 
were apparently no points along the arch which had been disturbed. It 
was estimated that the continuous impacts caused by dropping of concrete 
caused the failure. Also adding to the cause, was the weakness in the 
falsework due to insecure connections and very little pile penetration. 
Tacoma, Washington Bridge 
A rather unusual type of failure took place in a rather unusual 
type of bridge in the city of Tacoma, Washington in the fall of 1923 
(39, 122). The failure consisted in a crack necessitating the closing 
of the bridge to traffic until repairs could be made. The failure was 
investigated by a committee of the local chapter of the American Associa-
tion of Engineers and consisted of four men. 
The bridge was an unusual type as shown in Figure 15. The shape 
of the arch was elliptical and carried a considerable amount of earth 
load as we 11 as a railroad and two highway lanes. The width of the arch 
was 52 ft. which was made up of three separate arches of 18 ft., 16 ft., 
and 18 feet. These arches acted completely independent of each other. 
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Figure 15. Sketch showing crack in Tacoma, Washington Bridge (39) 
The failure did not result in a collapse but required immediate 
attention. The crack occurred at about the third point in the south end 
of the west rib. The nature of the crack was of a type which would 
require special attention and this is why a discussion of it is being 
included in this summary of bridge failures. Even though it was of a 
minor nature it could have resulted in a tragedy if a sudden collapse 
had taken place. 
The crack was very distinct and consisted of separations of as much 
as 2 in. at places and the lower end was being pushed in due to the great 
force of the earth load. The plane of the crack was horizontal which 
permitted no resistance to lateral movement of the abutment. A number 
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of the reinforcing bars had been broken and many showed signs of being 
stretched, which showed that the structure was nearing complete collapse. 
A close examination of the crack showed that it had been a construc-
tion joint which had been incorrectly placed. There had been no bond 
with the rest of the arch. The joint should have been placed in such a 
way as to resist the thrust caused by the earth fill, in other words, it 
should have been more normal to the face of the arch. 
There was laitance of from 1/2 to 1 in. at places along the crack. 
The laitance consisted of a fine whitish scum which formed on the surface 
of the green concrete because too much water was used in the cement mix-
ture. Most of the laitance which had been in the joint had been washed 
out by seeping ground water and resulted in large openings along the 
crack. Also, there were found scraps of wood and rubbish, all of which 
showed great carelessness on the part of the contractor and the inspector. 
The laitance should have been removed before continuation of the pour but 
was allowed to set and was probably jarred loose by the vibrations 
caused by traffic. The concrete on the remainder of the structure was 
found to be of very good quality. 
The cause of the failure, as described by the contractor, was that 
the concrete at the joint had received its initial set before resumption 
of pouring and that the workmen sent down into the forms to clean out 
the debris broke up the green concrete by walking on it and destroying 
its bond value. This was not the conclusion of the investigating commit-
tee. Their conclusion was that the cause of failure was due primarily 
to lack of bond due to laitance left in the construction joint, augmented 
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by the fact that the joint was not made normal to the thrust of the arch 
ring. 
The lesson of most value here is probably the dangers of allowing 
laitance to remain in a joint. Also, laitance will not occur if the 
cement mixture is correct. This is done by keeping the water-cement 
ratio to a minimum. This is probably not as much of a problem today 
because of the vibration methods used in placing concrete. The vibra-
tion permits the use of concrete with very low slumps, thereby keeping 
the amount of water used to a minimum. 
Summary 
A discussion of bridge failures in this chapter indicates the 
importance of proper construction methods. The causes of failure are: 
modification of field methods without calculation of stresses, lack of 
knowledge and experience of the person in charge, instability of sup-
porting members, a contractor attempting procedures not stated in 
specifications or design plans, use of faulty concrete with noncontinuous 
pour, and inadequate formwork. 
Ashtabula Bridge: 
This bridge failure was a major disaster in that 92 lives were lost 
when a 156 ft. truss railroad bridge collapsed in 1876 (4, 5, 6). 
The truss was the first attempt to change from the usual wood to 
wrought iron, increasing the weight considerably. 
The erection was faulty in that many modifications were made in the 
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field by adding members, cutting, chipping and forcing of members to fit. 
There was much disagreement of persons in charge in the methods of con-
struction used. This, along with very low factors of safety, was the 
cause of failure. 
Second Quebec Bridge: 
This was a second attempt to span the St. Lawrence River where the 
First Quebec Bridge failed during construction in 1907 (3, 11, 12, 22, 
38, 97). This second bridge was of the same type and the failure 
resulted in the loss of 13 workmen. It occurred in 1916 when the center 
span was being hoisted between the end cantilever sections. The center 
span fell from its chains into the river. 
Modifications were made in the lifting apparatus to provide a more 
stable condition and the lifting procedure was then successful. 
Germany's Frankenthal Bridge: 
The construction of this bridge over the Rhine River at Manneheim, 
Germany began in 1939 (64). The construction procedure was by the canti-
lever method which was necessary to provide channel clearance for naviga-
tional purposes. The cantilever was 370 ft. beyond a pier at the time of 
collapse. Thirty-six workers lost their lives. 
The cross-section of the bridge consisted of four welded girders but 
a transition was made to two girders when construction was again started 
in 1950. 
The cause of the collapse was due to carelessness on the part of the 
construction superintendent in extending the cantilever beyond that for 
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which it was designed before a temporary pier was built to adequately 
support it. 
Spokane River Bridge: 
The collapse of this bridge took place in 1917 during the construc-
tion operation and just shortly before completion of the concrete arches 
(20, 90, 102). 
It was determined that failure was due to incorrect concrete pours 
which were from great heights and too many being concentrated at one 
location. 
Another factor which contributed to the failure was the weakness of 
the falsework. Many of the connections were very insecure and pile pene-
tration was very inadequate. 
Tacoma, Washington Bridge: 
This was not a collapse but it was impending (39, 122). The bridge 
was in the form of an arch and failure was taking place along a horizontal 
construction joint. Faulty construction in allowing laitance in the con-
struction joint resulted in large openings. Large earth pressure began 
to make the condition more serious along with traffic loads. 
86 
FAILURES DUE TO BRTTTLE FRACTURE 
General 
There are three bridge failures summarized in this chapter which 
were mainly a result of brittle fracture. 
The increasing use of high strength steels has increased attention 
in the phenomenon of the failure of a ductile material in a brittle 
manner. It is not so much the material being brittle, but rather it is 
the susceptibility to brittle failure that can be built into structures 
with improper design. 
It is more economical to design with the use of high strength 
steels, but at the same time there is more of a chance for improper de-
sign than in conventional steel. Proper design is taking advantage of 
ordinary and economical grades of steel and using them to their fullest 
potential. 
The following summary will discuss various ways by which steel 
bridges have failed under conditions making them more susceptible to 
brittle fracture. 
Kings Bridge 
The collapse of the Kings Bridge at Melbourne, Australia on July 10, 
1962 was of a somewhat unique character and one from which many lessons 
can be learned (15, 45, 53). 
The failure was a partial collapse of a 100 ft. span and took place 
when a truck transporting a 30 ton crane passed over the bridge. The 
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partial collapse resulted from brittle fracture of the steel and was 
brought about by improper steel for welding, unsatisfactory design details 
and low temperatures. 
The Kings Bridge consisted of two 2300 ft. long parallel one-way 
bridges over the Yarra River. The bridge consisted of four lines of 
welded girders made up of high tensile steel with a reinforced concrete 
deck. The bottom flange was strengthened by the use of cover plates 
which terminated about 16 ft. from the end of the girder. The web was 
strengthened by use of vertical intermediate stiffeners welded to the 
web. 
The failure was investigated by a Royal Commission of Enquiry and 
was reported to Parliament, the main part of the report being that there 
was insufficient notch ductibility of the steel used in the girders. 
Cracks occurred at seven different places within the one span. Three 
of the girders had cracks at both ends of the cover plate and the fourth 
girder had a crack at one end of its cover plate. Some of the cracks 
were completely through the flange and almost through the web. 
The Royal Commission report stated that the cracks were caused by 
the unfamiliarity of the fabricator with the problems of welding low-
alloy steel, and the quality of the steel, much of which was so high in 
carbon and so unexpectedly variable, that even an experienced fabricator 
would have had difficulties in welding it. 
The specifications were to conform to the British Standard Specifica-
tion 968: 1941. The minimum required yield point for the low-alloy high 
tensile strength steel was 55,000 psi. The chemical composition was 
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required to be as follows: carbon 0.23 per cent; manganese 1.8 per cent; 
chromium 1.0 per cent; and manganese plus chromium 2.0 per cent. The 
report showed the analysis of the actual failed girders to be as follows: 
carbon 0.28 per cent; manganese 1.80 per cent and chromium 0.25 per cent. 
This analysis shows that the carbon content was too high resulting in a 
more brittle steel. 
Another factor which was thought to be partly responsible for the 
failure was the fact that the design was done as a joint venture by four 
consulting firms under a subcontract to the general contractor. This 
made it unsuitable to provide the necessary supervision which should have 
been required normally. If a firm had been hired directly by the agency 
who was to own the bridge, there would have been inspectors directly 
responsible on the job at all times. 
One major event which was critical occurred when the fabricators 
placed an order with a producer for steel in accordance with the specifica-
tions but statements requiring certain additional tests were omitted. 
Somehow they were bound to accept the steel without these tests and at 
the same time, were bound to the contractor to supply girders of steel 
which had been subjected to these additional tests. As a result, the 
fabricators failed to make sufficient tests to ensure the notch ductility 
and correct chemical analysis. 
The method of welding was a large factor also. It is necessary to 
preheat any low-alloy high tensile steel before welding. It was concluded 
that there was an inadequate amount of preheating. 
A brittle fracture takes place more readily in a high carbon steel 
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with a decreasing temperature. There is also more of a tendency for this 
type of failure with an increase in material thickness. A brittle failure 
may take place very easily if a sharp notch is present in the steel at a 
point of high stress. Brittle fractures have occurred at lower than 
permissible working stresses. This is only possible when there are high 
residual stresses present. This area of residual stress usually occurs 
at welded connections with yielding at the welded area. If the fracture 
is arrested before complete failure the only way to re-initiate the 
fracture is for the remaining cross-section to be stressed to the yield 
point. 
There must be three conditions to allow brittle fractures to take 
place. First there must be a notch or flaw. Second the temperature of 
the metal must be below the transition temperature which is the tempera-
ture at which the steel changes from ductile to brittle state. This 
transition temperature varies with the chemical composition, thickness 
and the rolling temperature. Third there must be yield stresses present. 
These could be partly caused by loading and partly by residual stresses. 
From the inspection of the fraFtures in the Kings Bridge it was 
evident that they were two-stage or three-stage fractures. It is quite 
clear that small surface cracks occurred at the toe of the cover plate 
caused by improper welding in this area. These small cracks acted as 
notches and probably took place in the fabricating shop. Even small 
surface cracks would decrease the section modulus a great deal and, as 
a result, the remaining cross-section could become overstressed. This 
would re-initiate the fracture. 
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Welding of high tensile strength steel can be done, but the steel 
must be preheated. Before any welding takes place a sample of the same 
steel used in the structure should be welded and checked under a micro-
scope for cracks. Its chemical composition must be satisfactory. It 
must be certain that the same chemical composition exists in the material 
for the actual structure. 
The steel used in the Kings Bridge had various chemical compositions. 
The British Standard Specifications 968: 1941 required the chemical 
composition to be specified by ladle analysis. The amount of carbon was 
in some cases considerably higher than that specified by the ladle analy-
sis. The manganese and chromium were also at their upper limits. There-
fore the tensile strength was much higher than specified which made 
welding even more difficult. This fact along with a lack of knowledge 
as to how to weld this type of steel, variable composition and poor in-
spection made failure almost certain to take place. The fabricator should 
obtain information on the actual chemical analysis of the plates shipped 
from the manufacturer. 
Hasselt Bridge 
Another bridge failure due to brittle fracture was the complete col-
lapse of a 245 ft. Vierendeel truss bridge near Hasselt, Belgium on 
March 14, 1938 (24, 25, 32, 68). 
The bridge was supported only at the abutments and was made up of 
a curved top chord, twelve vertical rigid frame panels without diagonals, 
and a horizontal lower chord which carried a 32 ft. roadway and two 5 ft. 
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Figure 16. Structural details of Hasselt Bridge members; 
numerous fractures occurred along line AA (25) 
sidewalks. Figure 16 shows the make-up of all the members. All splices 
in the bridge were of the butt weld type with no splice plates. There 
were twelve panels and panels 2, 4, 7, 9 and 11 contained field welds 
in the top and bottom chords. The curved gusset plates were shop welded 
which allowed for the straight vertical portion of the panels to be 
welded in the field. 
The collapse was gradual and time was allowed for the bridge to be 
cleared of any traffic. The collapse began with a loud report and a 
crack appeared in the lower chord between the third and fourth verticals. 
The bridge did not fall as it was temporarily being supported by the top 
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arch chord. It took about six minutes for a horizontal shear at the 
abutments to take place and then the bridge broke in two places with the 
center portion lying on the river bottom (see Figure 17). This bridge 
had only been in operation 14 months and its cost was $125,000. 
Figure 17. The Hasselt Bridge after collapse (25) 
There should have been sufficient experience gained in the construe-
tion of this type of bridge as 50 had been built in Belgium in the 
previous six years. The design of this type of bridge originally con-
sisted of shop welds and field riveting but had recently been changed 
to field welding only. 
The cause of the collapse, as reported by the Belgian Commission 
appointed to investigate, was poor quality steel along with poor welding. 
The steel which was required in the specifications was to have been 
Belgian St. 42 with a tensile strength of from 52,000 psi to 64,000 psi. 
One factor which appeared very questionable was the welding of the 
3/4 in. web plates to 2 1/8 in. thick flange plates with only a 3/8 in. 
weld. Also the homogeneity of such thick plates was a matter of concern. 
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The carbon content was to be 0.15 per cent and the sulphur and 
phosphorus not more than 0.03 per cent. This chemical analysis would 
almost certainly result in a metal very satisfactory for welding. The 
primary fractures occurred at points of weld and it was believed that the 
heat used in welding had made the steel brittle. Other fractures oc-
curred a distance away from welds but these were a result of the impact 
during collapse. 
There was believed to be stress concentrations during welding at 
the splice between the curved gusset plates and the top and bottom 
chords. This welding had to be done with both ends being quite rigidly 
restrained. Many fractures occurred at these points although they 
probably occurred during the fall of the bridge, 
The erection was a problem due to the poor alignment of the adjacent 
members in the shop. This resulted in additional stresses caused by 
forcing of members to fit and also additional welds being used to make 
up the difference in alignment. 
The quality of the steel was undoubtedly poor as the appearance of 
the fractures were quite similar to that of cast-iron. The quality of 
the weld was also poor and would not have been accepted as complying 
with any of the structural weld specifications of today. There was lack 
of penetration, undercutting and very irregular surfaces. It appeared 
that very large electrodes were used which also could cause additional 
stresses. Also many field welds were made in danger zones which 
resulted in internal stresses being built up. 
The effects of welding on a steel structure is an area which requires 
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a large amount of study and experience. Shrinkage stresses also can be 
introduced by welding. 
Although about fifty bridges of similar design had been built in 
Belgium, this bridge was probably a victim of an unfortunate combination 
of factors contributing to its failure. 
Duplessis Bridge 
The Duplessis Bridge spanning the St. Maurice River at Three Rivers, 
Quebec collapsed at 3:00 a.m. on January 31, 1951 and four lives were 
lost (16, 24, 29, 116, 123). The temperature was 30° below zero and 
fortunately the traffic was very light at the time or possibly more lives 
would have been lost. 
The bridge was.completed in 1947 and was of the welded girder type 
with two lines of girders, a composite reinforced concrete deck and 
transverse floor beams. The cost of the bridge was $3,000,000. There 
actually were two bridges, one referred to as the East Crossing and the 
other the West Crossing. The two were joined by a small island at the 
center of the river. The failure took place in the West Crossing which 
consisted of eight spans of continuous steel girders. This west struc-
ture was 1380 ft. long having six 180 ft. spans and two 150 ft. spans. 
The deck was made up of an 8 in. thick reinforced concrete deck which 
acted compositely with the top flanges of the girders. The roadway was 
42 ft. wide and carried four lanes of traffic. It was designed for 
alternate loading of one 20 ton truck per lane with a 30 per cent impact 
loading and a 100 psf uniform load on the floor beams and 70 psf on the 
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girders. The depth of the girders was 12 ft. at the piers and 8 ft. at 
midspan. 
The bridge was designed by the engineering staff of the Department 
of Public Works of the Province of Quebec and constructed by Dufresne 
Engineering Company, Ltd. of Montreal. The structural steel was fabrica-
ted and erected by the Dominion Bridge Company, Ltd., Lackine, Province 
of Quebec. 
The four west spans of the West Crossing fell into the ice covered 
river without warning. There were partial failures prior to this col-
lapse which seem to indicate the cause of the January 31 collapse. The 
first failure took place in February of 1950 with cracking of the top 
flange taking place in a negative moment section at the end weld of the 
cover plates in the heat affected zone. These fractures were discovered 
at various places but one had been located in one of the spans that 
failed. Some of the fractures extended down through the web and partially 
into the lower flange. The reason there was no collapse at that time was 
because of the composite action and the deck reinforcement resisting the 
tension forces. The concrete deck was serving as the top tension flange 
until repair. 
The board appointed to investigate the bridge failure consisted of 
a lawyer and a civil engineer, both of Montreal. It was at first reason-
able to assume that the collapse was caused by a brittle fracture of the 
steel resulting from faulty material with a notch sensitivity very ab-
normal. This was later observed in laboratory tests. The plates which 
nade up the girders were of poor quality rimmed steel which means there 
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were gas bubbles entrapped in the steel during solidification. A high 
percentage of carbon and sulfur was discovered in the chemical analysis. 
The structural steel was supplied by a Canadian mill that normally 
produced sheets and strips of steel for which rimmed steel was suitable. 
The structural steel with the above characteristics has a great tendency 
for brittle fracture at low temperatures. Analyses of the steel showed 
carbon content ranging from 0.23 to 0.40 per cent; the sulphur from 0.04 
to 0.116 per cent; and manganese from 0.30 to 0.33 per cent. This in-
dicated extensive segregation in the chemical analyses. Also yield 
strengths had been reported varying from 27,800 psi to 57,800 psi with 
an average tensile strength of 58,000 psi. The high carbon portions of 
the plates were undesirable for welding. Although the weld appeared to 
be of good quality, there may have been some undetected cracks. Authori-
ties on welding consider use of such a steel inadvisable in a welded 
structure because high carbon and impurities lead to poor notch toughness 
especially in cold weather. 
Summary 
It is hoped the reader has become more aware of the conditions that 
lead to brittleness of otherwise ductile steel. It is of utmost impor-
tance that a designer becomes aware that these conditions exist. With 
this knowledge he then can obtain the necessary design criteria to 
minimize the chances of brittle fracture. 
The following factors increase the susceptibility of steel to brittle 
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fracture: improper wzlds, low temperatures, high carbon content of the 
steel, and stress concentrations due to field welding of very rigid joints. 
These were all found in the bridge failures summarized below. 
Kings Bridge: 
The collapse of a portion of the Kings Bridge at Melbourne, Aus-
tralia in 1962 was a lesson in the use of high s~rength steels along with 
lack of knowledge in its use and weldability (15, 45, 53). Also the 
common aspect of inadequate inspection was an important factor in the 
collapse. 
The cause of the failure was low notch ductility along with variable 
carbon content of the steel and unfamiliarity of the fabricator with the 
welding of a steel of such high tensile strength. 
There were several cracks in the flanges and webs along the bridge 
length. The most common occurrence of cracking was at the toe of the 
cover plates. These cracks originated in the welded portion and were 
caused by residual stresses near the weld. 
Hasselt Bridge: 
Another example of brittle fracture was the collapse in 1938 in 
Hasselt, Belgium of a 245 ft. single span Vierendael truss type bridge 
(24, 25, 32, 68). The truss consisted of an arch upper chord and 
vertical panels which were rigidly welded to the top and bottom chords. 
The connections were welded at the construction site rather than riveted 
which had been done previously in many other bridges of similar type. 
Cause of the collapse was poor weldability of unsatisfactory 
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material. The carbon content was unusually high, resulting in brittle 
steel. Also, some connections had been forced into alignment and welded 
thus causing additional residual stresses over and above those caused by 
welding. 
Duplessis Bridge: 
This bridge was located at Three Rivers, Quebec and a portion of it 
collapsed in 1951 on a cold winter day with a loss of four lives (16, 24' 
29, 116, 123). 
This bridge was of the welded girder type and failure was caused 
by brittle fracture. The very low temperature at the time accounted for 
its low ductility along with a carbon content much higher than specifica-
tions would allow. This also resulted in poor weldability in the girders. 
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FAILURES DUE TO INADEQUATE FOUNDATIONS 
~ooral 
Four bridge failures are discussed in this report which were 
caused by inadequate foundation material. This type of failure, how-
ever, does not seem to belong in the same category with structural 
failures. The structure may be very sound structurally but with the 
failure of the supporting material the structure must yield. This yield-
ing, of course, results in stresses which cannot possibly be resisted. 
Foundation material should be investigated by persons well quali-
fied in that specific field. There are many variables with which to 
deal. Some sound judgment, along with past experience, is necessary. 
Therefore, it is a very special field and the designer must rely on the 
results of their study. With a maximum allowable bearing value obtained 
the designer may then proceed with the design of the structure. 
It is the object of this section to give the reader a better under-
standing of the importance of a satisfactory foundation. In subsequent 
paragraphs, a brief summary is given of the failures of the four bridge 
failures resulting from foundation problems. 
Custer Creek Railroad Bridge 
There were 47 lives lost when a passenger train of the Chicago, 
Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad plunged into Custer Creek on 
June 19, 1938 (87, 101). The foundation of the piers had been undermined 
by flash flooding due to a cloudburst about 25 miles upstream from the 
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site of the accident. Custer Creek is normally a dry run creek about 
nine months of the year. The engine, along with two coaches, two tourist 
sleepers, a baggage car and a mail car plunged into the stream without 
any warning. 
The bridge was made up of eight spans, three of which were continuous 
plate girders and five which were concrete trestle spans. All were sup-
ported on concrete piers which had spread footings on gravel 10 ft. below 
stream bed. 
The bridge had been inspected only two months prior to the accident 
and appeared to be in excellent condition. The Milwaukee bridges were 
routinely inspected four times a year. This bridge was 25 years old and 
had received no trouble due to flooding during its lifetime. 
Today it is probably unheard of to build a pier foundation on gravel. 
Piling are normally used to support a pier and spread footings are only 
used when solid rock can be found near to the surface of the ground. 
Usually if there is solid rock which can be reached with a reasonable 
length of pile the pile will be driven to bear on the rock. As in the 
case of gravel, pile bearing by friction can be built up very rapidly, 
thus requiring a rather short pile. 
Peace River Bridge 
A foundation failure was the cause of a collapse on October 16, 
1957 of the Peace River Bridge on the Alcan Highway in British Columbia 
(19, 78, 79). The bridge had a total length of 2,130 feet. This was 
made up of a main suspended span of 930 ft, suspended end spans of 465 ft. 
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each and simple supported truss spans of 135 feet. The truss spans con-
nected the anchorage blocks with the first piers. The main suspension 
cables were made up of 1 7/8 in. strands in rectangular shape. There 
had been no movement of the anchorage blocks since it was built in 1942 
as a part of the rush war program to complete the Alcan Highway. Slip-
ping of the anchorage block at the north shore was noticed twelve hours 
before the collapse and was evidenced by the breaking of a water supply 
line passing in front of the block. The supply line was for the Pacific 
Petroleum Company which is a part of great industrial activity in the 
two years preceding the failure. It was thought that possibly the dis-
turbance of the bank was brought about by considerable construction in 
the area adjacent to the bridge. 
The anchorage was founded on shale which may have deteriorated into 
clay. No piling had been used under the anchorage blocks or under the 
piers because of great amount of haste in its construction. Any movement 
was to be resisted by keying into what was considered very firm shale. 
When there was noticeable movement of the anchorage, traffic was 
removed and a large crowd gathered to watch the collapse. At the time 
of the collapse the anchorage blocks had slipped a distance of 12 ft. at 
the north shore. This slipping caused the first pier to topple, which 
dropped the truss span and also the adjacent suspended span into the 
river. The other spans remained intact but there was a large deflection 
in the main span, 
According to a consulting engineer this failure was the end to many 
partial failures that had occurred since its construction. Soon after 
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its opening to traffic there was observed to be a great amount of vibra-
tion in the suspension cables which resulted in breaking of strands. 
Seventy-one broken strands were reported and repaired at various times 
during 1947. It was reported by the Advisory Board on the Investigation 
of Suspension Bridges in 1952 that there was serious oscillation in the 
wind and in 1955 serious scouring of one pier took place. 
The loss of this bridge created problems in how to handle the traffic 
which normally passed over the bridge. A ferry was used as a temporary 
rreasure and a railroad bridge near the site was decked over and used for 
highway vehicles. 
A study of the remaining portion of the bridge took place with the 
result that repair was not feasible and that the bridge should be re-
placed. 
New River Bridge 
The failure of a reinforced concrete bridge across the New River 
in the Imperial Valley in southern California took place in the early 
twenties (40). This was a progressive failure and was the subject of 
attention of the California State Highway Department for some time. 
In 1905 and 1906 the Colorado River overflowed its banks and spread 
out over a strip of land about six miles wide and extended from the 
Salton Sea to the Mexican border. As the waters receded a new channel 
began to be formed. At first the channel was approximately 800 ft. wide 
and was eroded to a final depth below the original ground level of about 
100 feet. The final cutting resulted in a narrow gorge about 60 ft. deep 
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at the center of the newly formed river. A cross-section of the river 
at the location of the bridge is shown in Figure 18. 
The soil consisted of loose loam and appeared to be the same type 
throughout the depth of the pier piling. 
The bridge was built in 1918 by Imperial County on the State High-
way from San Diego to Imperial Valley and spans the New River. The 
bridge consisted of eleven bents of 30 ft. each making the length of the 
bridge 330 feet. Three of the bents were in the deep cut of the channel 
which had been cut even deeper since the construction of the bridge thus 
leaving a considerable amount of the piles exposed in two of the bents. 
There were two clusters of concrete piles for each bent, above which was 
formed a reinforced concrete footing and a square concrete pier column. 
There was great difficulty in driving the piles which would seem to 
indicate a stable material. 
In early 1920 there appeared to be a lateral movement of the center 
of the bridge indicated by cracks forming with apparent tilting of the 
Figure 18. Reinforced concrete trestle over New River in Imperial 
Valley, showing movement of bents (40) 
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pier columns in the downstream direction. Cracks were appearing at or 
near the ground line and at the connection between the pier caps and the 
concrete girders. The abutments also were moving towards the center of 
the stream. The first bent from the west abutment showed a movement of 
the bottom of the column relative to the top of about 10 in. towards the 
center of the river. 
The apparent cause of the failure which became increasingly more 
serious was the lateral movement of the soil, this movement being per-
mitted by the release of pressure due to the cutting of the deep channel. 
There were also settlements of as much as 1 ft. at the approaches to the 
bridge. 
Big Sioux River Bridge 
One of the twin bridges carrying Interstate 29 over the Big Sioux 
River between Iowa and South Dakota collapsed in April of 1962 as a 
result of high flood waters (47, 91). The flood waters were about 25 ft. 
above normal at the time of the collapse. There was no traffic on the 
bridge at the time of the collapse. 
The bridge was completed in 1959 at a cost of about $200,000. It 
was designed to withstand the greatest flood which may occur in a 50 year 
period. The cost of the bridge was shared by the federal government at 
a rate of 90 per cent, the remainder being shared between South Dakota 
State Highway Department and Iowa State Highway Department. The federal 
government's share in any repair is only 50 per cent of the repair cost. 
The bridge was a continuous welded plate girder with a total length of 
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556 ft. with a reinforced concrete deck and supported on four piers. 
The piers were supported by timber piles and the apparent undermining of 
one of these piers by flood waters was the primary cause of the collapse. 
The bridge was located just upstream from the junction of the Big 
Sioux with the Missouri River. At the time of the very high flows in the 
Big Sioux the Corps of Engineers had cut the flow in the Missouri from 
15,000 cfs to 5,000 cfs at Garvin's Point Dam, 75 miles upstream to 
prevent flood damage and the flow in the Big Sioux was measured at 
55,000 cfs. This great differential was thought to have caused a very 
high velocity at the bridge site thus causing scouring at the vicinity 
of the piers. The piers were built at an angle of about 30° with the 
direction of flow evidently with the thought of a channel change some-
time in the future. This could have caused some eddying at the piers. 
The conclusion arrived at by the Bureau of Public Roads was as 
follows (47): 
1. The location of the bridge was not considered the best from the 
engineering point of view but seemed to be a result of a right-
of-way problem 
2. The combination of the very high flooding in both 1960 and 1962 
along with the skewed piers which reduced the effective water-
way by 35 to 40 per cent were large factors in the failure 
3. Insufficient study was given by both state departments and 
the Bureau of Public Roads to the effect of obstructions in 
the channel 
4. It was noticed that scouring of the banks was taking place and 
attention was given to that and scouring under the piers went 
unnoticed 
5. The recently constructed Fort Randall and Gavin's Point Dam 
changed the flood-flow conditions in the Missouri River. 
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This failure points out the fact that more study is needed of the 
bridge site as to its hydraulic and foundation characteristics. Also, 
there is need for more thorough inspection following any flooding in the 
area. 
Summary 
The foundation failures discussed indicate to the reader what type 
of problems may result from improper foundation material. It is difficult 
to determine which type of foundation failure is the most common. 
Shale is a satisfactory foundation material but care must be taken 
as deterioration sometimes takes place when subjected to air or water. 
Exposure of the shale during excavating to place foundations many times 
results in difficulty in the future. It is quite common for foundations 
keyed into shale to eventually have some lateral movement. 
Foundations placed on sand or gravel are obviously susceptible to 
failure in the event of rapidly moving water. The placing of piers 
within a stream in a manner which acts as an obstruction to the normal 
flow of water can cause serious problems. This must be given consider-
able thought and study prior to the design and must be inspected regularly 
following completion of the bridge construction, 
The following bridge failures will illustrate the problems involved 
with various foundation materials. 
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Custer Creek Railroad Bridge: 
As a result of a flash flood this railroad bridge collapsed in 1938 
with the tragic loss of 47 lives (87, 101). 
The bridge was made up of eight spans. The piers were supported by 
spread footings on gravel 10 ft. below stream bed which was normally a 
dry run creek. The undermining of the piers caused a sudden collapse of 
the bridge. 
Peace River Bridge: 
This was a bridge failure which was a result of the failure of 
foundation material (19, 78, 79). The bridge was a suspension bridge 
with a main span of 930 feet. Anchorage was made by large concrete 
deadmen which were keyed into shale. This shale apparently had deteriora-
ted and allowed the deadman to move at one end of the bridge. A movement 
of 12 ft. caused the first pier to collapse and followed by the collapse 
of the main suspended span. 
New River Bridge: 
The failure of this bridge was unusual in that the foundation 
material moved laterally from both abutments toward the center of the 
stream (40). The piers moved toward the center of the stream also. 
The movement of the soil was due to a deep channel being formed by 
flooding of the Colorado River. This channel caused the release of 
passive pressure and slipping began. 
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Big Sioux River Bridge: 
This bridge failure took place in 1962 where Interstate 29 crosses 
the Big Sioux River between Iowa and South Dakota (47, 91). 
The failure was a result of a large flood undermining one of the 
piers but the conditions at the time were aggravated by insufficient 
hydraulic study, skewed piers with future channel change proposed, im-
proper maintenance inspection, and a high flow gradient caused by lowering 
of the flow in the Missouri River into which the Big Sioux flows. 
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FAILURES DUE TO UNDETERMINED CAUSE 
General 
There are four bridge failures discussed in this report where the 
cause of failure is undetermined. In three of the failures the courts 
were unable to place the responsibility of the failure on anyone. In 
the most recent failure, the Point Pleasant Bridge, the cause is still 
under investigation. 
Quite often it is difficult or impossible to determine where the 
responsibility for a failure lies. In the event of the collapse of a 
bridge pier it is difficult to determine whether the failure was due to 
scour or to poor foundation material. If scour could be determined as 
the cause it would possibly indicate lack of maintenance or lack of de-
sign in providing adequate protection. If poor foundation material is 
definitely the cause then the responsibility lies with the designer. 
The designer must obtain adequate preliminary information regarding the 
foundation material and hydraulics. An example of this is the failure 
of the Claverack Bridge in the following summary. 
It is hoped that the reader may become more aware of the unusual 
circumstances which may take place. Every significant step in the 
design of a structure must be given the greatest amount of consideration. 
The engineer must be ab le to keep an "open mind" and not let the design 
become so routine that he fails to consider significant factors. 
The following summary of bridge failures will discuss the types 
of failures where the cause was undetermined. 
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Point Pleasant Bridge 
The collapse of the suspension bridge over the Ohio River between 
Point Pleasant, West Virginia and Gallipolis, Ohio on December 15, 1967 
is probably the bridge failure of most interest to engineers and to the 
general public at the present time (31, 49, 82). This is due to the 
tragic loss of life and to the fact that investigations into the cause 
are being carried on at the present time. 
First of all it would seem proper before discussing and trying to 
analyze the failure to go back to 1929 and describe the construction of 
the bridge. This bridge was of a unique design and still is quite 
unique today. This bridge was the first of its type to be built in the 
United States. The unique features of the bridge were: unusual type of 
anchorages, the use of heat-treated eyebar chains which were used in 
part to take the place of the top chord of the stiffening truss, and 
inclusion of methods to make any adjustments in the chains, hangers, or 
trusses after erection was complete. 
The total length of the bridge was 2,235 ft., which included a 
center span of 700 ft. and spans of 380 ft. with the remaining 775 ft. 
divided between the two anchorages. The roadway width was 22 ft. with 
a 5 ft. sidewalk and designed for an American Society of Civil Engineers 
H-15 loading. 
The original design consisted of the usual type of continuous 
suspension cables and a stiffening truss. An alternative design was 
later presented for bids, this alternative being the one that was built. 
This design consisted of approximately half of the top chord of the 
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stiffening truss as a part of the suspension system which was made up of 
eyebars. The bridge was owned by the West Virginia-Ohio River Bridge 
Company and was operated as a toll bridge replacing ferry service in the 
past. 
The unique feature of the anchorage was the fact that it did not 
consist of the usual gravity type anchorages on solid rock. The solid 
rock was too far down in this case and would have been much too expen-
sive to reach. The horizontal pull of the suspension cables on the 
anchorage was about 4,500,000 lbs. The anchorage design was as shown 
in Figure 19, with the horizontal force of the cables being resisted by 
the dead load of the anchorage and the shear resistance of the concrete 
piles. There were 405 octagonal reinforced concrete piles, 16 in. 
diameter, driven to about 12 ft. with the top 3 ft. enbedded in the 
bottom of the concrete trough which was 32 ft. wide. This trough was 
filled with earth fill and the approach roadway was poured on it. 
The eyebars of the chain were heat-treated carbon steel with an 
ultimate strength of 105,000 psi and had an elastic limit of 75,000 psi. 
The design working stress was 50,000 psi. The chains formed the top 
chord of the stiffening truss for 12 of the 28 panels of the center span 
and the first 7 panels of the end spans. 
The towers were 103 1 -10 1/4" high and were designed to allow for 
change in length of the spans due to temperature and to permit movement 
due to moving live loads. This was permitted by the design of a rocker 
at the base of the tower, the upper part of the shoe being curved and 
the lower part being flat. 
Figure 19. 
Section A-A 
---7~--J-
I 
I 
___________________________________________ ,] 
Details of anchorage of Point Pleasant Bridge (49) 
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The make-up of the stiffening truss can be seen in Figure 20 and 
were of the laced channel type. The fact that there was no allowance 
for any adjustments to be made when erection was complete was an inter-
esting feature. The last panel to be placed, which was the panel at the 
center of the bridge, could not be fabricated until final measurements 
could be made. The only error to be found was 5/16 in. in placing of 
the anchor bolts which was very remarkable. 
The eyebar chains were erected by use of a traveler supported by 
an erection cable as shown in Figure 20. The cables were adjusted to a 
sag of 46 ft. in the main span under no load and a temperature of 68° F. 
With any other temperature the necessary adjustments had to be made. 
Erection of the eyebars proceeded from the center of the main span toward 
the tower and at the same time from the cable bents toward the towers, 
with the final link placed at the tower. This was done to maintain 
balance throughout the bridge. 
The stiffening truss was erected in the same sequence as the eyebar 
chain. When the top chord was replaced by the eyebar chain the gusset 
plate which was to receive the diagonals was not drilled until all 
members and dead load were in place. In order to complete the truss 
before the roadway was in place, drums filled with water were used to 
supply the equivalent dead load. 
The bridge was designed by J. E. Greiner Company and built under 
its supervision. The General Contracting Corporation of Pittsburgh, Pa., 
was the general contractor of the piers, anchorages, and approaches. The 
American Bridge Company furnished and erected the steel superstructure. 
w.VA. 
Point Pleasant 
Erection Detoils ot Top of Tower 
Figure 20. Details of Point Pleasant Bridge (49) 
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It took eleven months to complete the bridge. 
The bridge collapsed on December 15, 1967 during rush hour traffic 
at which tin~ the traffic was almost motionless. Twenty-four vehicles 
were removed from the river with the loss of 46 lives. 
The bridge apparently failed on one side first and dumped the 
vehicles into about 70 ft. of water, then with the bridge twisting like 
a ribbon it eventually collapsed from anchorage to anchorage. The 
towers then collapsed on top of the wreckage and vehicles. 
There have been many ideas as to the cause but the exact cause has 
not yet been determined. One suspension bridge expert explained that 
the ratio of dead load to live load usually ranges between 5 to 1 and 
8 to 1 but in this bridge the ratio was less and the live load increas-
ing all the time. He felt that the failure may have been due to fatigue. 
A partner of the design firm explained how the design of a bridge 
is much different today than it was then. The engineers would prepare 
stress sheets and the stee 1 and bridge contractors would design. 1;:0 .. me.et 
the needs. Today the engineer designs the complete bridge from abut-
ment to abutment. 
It had been reported that some crystallization existed in some of 
the breaks, many of which occurred due to the impact of the falling 
bridge. The head of the Department of Civil Engineering at Carnegie-
Mellon University in Pittsburgh had said there were no signs of fatigue 
as ductility apparently existed in the broken areas. He felt the bridge 
was overloaded with the live loading criteria much le&s than that for 
which we design today. However, it was quite certain that the bridge 
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was not overloaded. The total number of vehicles removed from the river 
was somewhat less than previously reported, Heavy concentrated loadings 
over a period of time could have caused fatigue of the members. 
It had been reported that there had been a flattening of the main 
span which may be of some interest in analyzing the collapse. The end 
spans were designed and erected with a 6.8 per cent grade and the main 
span was parabolic and tangent to the end spans. Over the years the main 
span had flattened which resulted in a noticeable "bump" at both towers. 
The accident is being investigated quite extensively by federal au-
thorities which include the National Transportation Safety Board, and the 
Bureau of Public Roads. The bridge was to be reassembled in two dimen-
sions as the pieces could be recovered from the river. 
The exact cause has not been found at the present time but a new 
bridge has been designed and construction is under way at the time of 
this writing. The National Transportation Safety Board of Washington, 
D.C., has published an interim report on the failure dated October 4, 
1968. This report covers the facts and circumstances surrounding this 
bridge failure along with recommendations and conclusions. The final 
report as to the cause of failure will be drawn up when the examination 
and analysis are complete. 
Bluestone River Bridge 
An erection failure which took the lives of 5 workmen occurred on 
March 31, 1949 (9, 10, 21, 84). The bridge was located near Hinton, 
West Virginia and was being built to span the Bluestone River. 
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The method of erection was the cantilever process. At the time of 
the collapse, span 3 was being extended to reach pier 2 and was canti-
levered a distance of 231 feet. 
The bridge consisted of five spans as shown in Figure 21 and was to 
be a total length of 1,158 ft. between abutments. The span in which 
failure took place was the longest span of the bridge. At the time of 
the collapse a 7 ton guy derrick was being used to place an erection 
truss between the end of the cantilevered truss and pier 2. This was to 
take some of the load off during the construction of the remaining panels. 
It would seem to be a much more reasonable method of erection to canti-
lever equal distances out from each of piers 2 and 3 and meet at the 
center of the span. The truss span was in the position shown in plan 
in Figure 21 due to the snapping of the downstream top chord. The work-
men reported hearing a loud report just at the time of failure so there 
was no warning of failure taking place. 
At the time of the collapse there were attempts being made to 
beef up some of the main truss members to resist some of the erection 
stresses. The top chord which broke had been increased from a design 
section of two 13 in. channels of 31.8 lbs. per ft., and one 22 in. by 
1/2 in. cover plate to two 13 in. ship channels at 50 lbs. per ft. and 
one 22 in. by 1/2 in. cover plate. The erection truss which was being 
placed in position at the time of the accident was to be under the 
downstream truss. The other erection truss was not in position at the 
time. The weight of the erection truss was about 5 tons and was being 
boomed out by the derrick to be suspended beneath the main truss. It 
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Figure 21. Details of Bluestone River Bridge showing collapsed 
center span (84) 
was to be pinned at the end of the cantilevered position and the other 
end was to be placed on top of pier 2. 
There had been no unusual circumstances at the time, such as any 
appreciable wind or any superimposed loads which were not included in 
the design of the structure. The guy derrick was in motion at the time 
and this was considered the only reasonable answer to the collapse. 
There was, however, no known cause for the record. The same type 
of erection had been used successfully on a number of bridges previously 
and the material and stresses were determined to be satisfactory and in 
accordance with the West Virginia State Highway Department specifications. 
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The completion of the bridge was delayed six months by the accident. 
A change in erection was made when replacing span 3. The cantilever 
portion of span 3 was extended to within nine panels of pier 2, where 
before the cantilever was six panels longer. There were no design 
changes made. 
Hartford Bridge 
One of the longest welded plate girder spans to be built previous 
to 1941 was the 300 ft. span of the 270-300-270 ft. continuous girder 
bridge (59, 81). With only 48 ft. remaining to be erected to reach the 
first river pier there was a sudden collapse into the Connecticut River 
at Hartford, Connecticut. Fifteen lives were lost in this accident and 
several were seriously injured. The bridge was designed by the Connecti-
cut State Highway Department. Its length was 3,950 ft., which included 
long approach spans on both sides of the river. 
The method of erection was by cantilever, being supported at some 
point between the piers by falsework bents. The span which collapsed was 
being supported by a falsework bent 120 ft. from the first river pier. 
It is this bent which seemed to just "kick out" allowing the two canti-
levered girders to drop to the river. The first girders to be laid from 
the pier were 126 ft. in length and weighed 101 tons. These extended 
6 ft. beyond the falsework bent. A traveler erection derrick which was 
the largest ever built and weighed 176 tons had been used to add 96 ft. 
of additional girders. This had been completed and still another 96 ft. 
section was in the process of erection when the collapse took place. 
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The steel falsework bent was supported on two groups of 28 wood 
piles in each group. The piles were driven to rock at a distance of 
about 65 ft. before refusal. Steel grillages were placed on top of the 
pile groups to support the steel bent which reached about 65 ft. to the 
bottom of the girders. 
There were no other spans damaged in any way nor were any piers 
damaged. The end of the girders at the first pier were tied to the 
pier by steel plates bolted to anchors set in the concrete to prevent 
any uplift during the cantilever erection procedure. These plates were 
broken leaving the pier in undamaged condition. 
The collapse dropped 430 tons of structural steel into the river 
along with the 176 ton traveler and 32 workmen. The water was about 
15 ft. deep and the steel was a total loss. 
The cause of the failure was due to the movement of the falsework 
bent although it is not known what caused it to move. It could have been 
the instability of the material through which the piles were driven to 
reach rock. There had been known shifting of soil at the location of a 
dike some distance upstream. 
The reconstruction was started again in May of 1942 and the bridge 
was opened to traffic in September of 1942. The method of erection had 
been changed to the extent of using two falsework bents during the erec-
tion of each span and the wood piles were replaced by steel piles. 
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Claverack Bridge 
The failure of a reinforced concrete bridge over Claverack Creek 
at Hudson, N.Y., on February 26, 1918 was a rather minor type of failure 
but, nevertheless, is quite interesting in the way in which it failed 
and the lessons that can be learned from a failure of this type (14, 30, 
121). 
The bridge consisted of eight 30 ft. spans made up of a 22 in. thick 
slab reinforced with 1 in. square steel bars in the bottom of the slab. 
The same type of bars were placed over the piers to resist the negative 
moments. The slab was continuous and supported by floor beams on 2 ft. 
square concrete posts. Each post rested on a 6 ft. square by 2 ft. thick 
base and each base had four wooden piles under it. 
On the night of February 26, just seconds before a car went down 
with two of the end spans, a heavy truck had passed over the bridge with 
no apparent failure. All the spans were in the same condition after the 
failure as before. A clean break was apparent at the second pier with 
the slab apparently just shearing off. 
The failure is of interest also because of the sudden settlement of 
a portland cement plant on August 2, 1915 just a hundred yards downstream 
along the river bank. The plant sank into the ground so suddenly that 
5 men were buried alive. Only a chimney was left showing above the 
ground. The stream bed bulged upward so suddenly that water spilled 
over its banks and nearly covered the bridge, 
A study of the soil revealed a surface layer of cemented sand and 
gravel from 7 to 20 ft. thick. Under this layer was a soft, wet, unstable 
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clay of 100 to 120 ft. thick. It was believed that a movement of the 
apparently stable layer of gravel did permit the structure to sink into 
the soft clay. 
The collapse of the two spans was obviously the result of failure 
of the pier foundation material. The piles which were driven were re-
ported to have sunk,after being driven through the top gravel layer, due 
to only the static load of the 2,000 lb. hammer. Therefore, the pier 
columns were probably supported only by the foundation slab. 
It was found after the failure that the gravel around the founda-
tion, and even under it, had been washed away and that there was only a 
soft unstable clay beneath the foundation. Whether the gravel had been 
scoured away or had shifted due to a movement of the top strata was 
never determined. It was very possible the same type of accident had 
taken place as occurred to the cement plant a few years before. If this 
is the case, the responsibility would seem to lie with the designer who 
did not take due consideration of the type of soil which was to support 
the bridge. 
If the loss had been caused by scour, it points to the fact that 
maintenance authorities sometimes ignore the possibilities of pier under-
mining. The destructive action of water cannot be taken lightly. 
Summary 
A discussion of the bridge failures in this chapter are examples 
of failures which have occurred but no legal responsibility was placed 
on anyone. The Point Pleasant Bridge failure is still under investigation. 
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Three of the failures were of undetermined cause. 
Following is a short summary of the bridge failures in this cate-
gory. 
Point Pleasant Bridge: 
This bridge failure resulted in a tragic loss of 46 lives on Decem-
ber 15, 1967 during peak traffic (31, 49, 82). The bridge crossed the 
Ohio River between Point Pleasant, West Virginia and Kanauga, Ohio. 
The bridge was a suspended type with a 700 ft. main span. A unique 
feature of this bridge was a portion of the top chord of the stiffening 
truss being an integral part of the eyebar suspension chains. 
There were two bridges of the same design built in 1929, the other 
being closed to traffic at the present time for a large scale inspection. 
The Point Pleasant Bridge is being replaced and under construction at the 
time of this writing. 
The cause of the failure has not yet been determined although there 
are many theories as to the cause. 
Bluestone River Bridge: 
This failure took place during erection with the collapse of a 
cantilever span as final preparations were being made to connect with a 
pier (9, 10, 21, 84). 
There were 5 workmen killed as there was no warning of failure. A 
loud report was heard just at the instant of failure with the snapping of 
one top chord member. 
It was thought possible that the motion of a 7 ton derrick placing 
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additional members could have been the cause but this was not established 
f:ir the record. 
Hartford Bridge: 
This was an 840 ft. welded steel girder bridge of three spans. The 
collapse of one span took place in 1941 as it was being cantilevered 
toward another pier (59, 81). There were temporary piers used but for 
some unknown reason one of the temporary piers collapsed. There were 15 
workmen killed as a result of the failure. 
The probable cause was instability of the foundation material on 
which the temporary pier was placed, Shifting of soil had been known to 
have taken place at a dike some distance upstream. 
Additional temporary piers were used along with steel piles and the 
reconstruction took place without incident. 
Claverack Bridge: 
This failure involved a relatively small co11crete slab bridge and 
there were no lives lost (14, 30, 121). The failure of one span took 
place in 1918 with the shearing of a 22 in. thick slab at the pier. 
The interesting part of this failure is the conditions surrounding 
the bridge and which give a clue as to the cause. It was determined that 
a pier had settled either from lateral movement of the gravel layer which 
supported the pier or settlement. Which one actually occurred was not 
determined. 
A clue which would support the possibility of settlement was records 
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of the complete disappearance of a cement plant three years previously 
just a few hundred yards away from the bridge. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Failure of bridges is often associated with considerable incon-
venience and tragedy. However, it is a way of learning and a way of 
teaching. That is the general purpose of this report. It is very es-
sential that failures are made known and are not kept hidden. It is 
very possible that through knowledge of a past failure, some possible 
future failure may be averted. It is as important that we learn from 
the failures of others as from their successes. 
In Table 3 the 26 bridge failures reported herein are summarized. 
The failures began with the Ashtabula Bridge failure in 1876 and con-
tinue up to the Point Pleasant Bridge collapse in 1967. Some of these 
failures are minor and some are major, but all contain valuable les-
sons. Recommendations are given for each failure which, if they had 
been observed, would most certainly have contributed to the success of 
the structure. 
We are aware that many failures would be impossible to eliminate. 
However, many seem to be so unnecessary and possibly could have been 
prevented had sufficient precautions been taken. The public must be 
allowed to rely on the responsibility of the professional people who 
design and build the bridges. 
It can be seen in the table that a large number of failures were 
a result of lack of final creeks by competent personnel. It is common 
practice at the present time for a bridge to be designed by a profes-
sional design engineer and also to be completely checked by another 
Table 3. Summary of bridge failures 
Year of 
Bridge failure Failure 
Ashtabula 1876 Collapse of a truss 
Tay 
Tardes 
Viaduct 
1879 
1884 
Moenchenstein 
1891 
First 
Quebec 
a 
1907 
span under weight of 
passenger train 
Simple spans col-
lapsed during wind 
storm 
Superstructure 
lifted off support 
by wind force during 
erection 
Truss span collapsed 
under heavily loaded 
passenger train 
Collapse of canti-
lever and anchor 
section during con-
struction 
Cause 
General a 
c lassifica-
tion of 
cause 
Severe modification 
during construction 
with inexperienced 
personnel 
Defects in piers and 
modification of 
original design with-
out adequate checks 
Inadequate lateral 
support for launching 
mechanism 
Poor quality material 
and underdesign of truss 
members 
Erroneous stresses in 
members by using assumed 
weights in design 
c 
D 
D 
D 
I 
Recommendations 
Construction must be 
supervised by ex-
perienced personnel 
and constant inspec-
tion essential 
Higher standards for 
design and inspec-
tion 
Greater considera-
tion for wind forces 
on superstructure 
during erection 
More emphasis to be 
placed on increasing 
live loads 
Closer inspection 
and consideration of 
all significant 
factors 
D =design error; I = inadequate inspection; C = inadequate construction procedures, 
B brittle fracture; F =inadequate foundation; U =undetermined cause. 
Table 3. 
Bridge 
Attica 
Second 
Quebec 
Spokane 
River 
Claverack 
New River 
(Continued) 
Year of 
failure Failure 
1914 Collapse of truss 
span under weight 
of passenger train 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1920 
Suspended span fell 
while being hoisted 
to its final posi-
tion between two 
can ti levered spans 
Collapse of a con-
crete arch during 
construct ion 
Collapse of concrete 
span following move-
ment of pier 
Bottom of piers 
being moved by soil 
movement 
Cause 
General 
classifica-
tion of 
cause 
Damaged end post of 
truss with inadequate 
inspection 
Instability of lifting 
apparatus 
Improper procedure of 
concrete pour and 
faulty falsework 
Undetermined; foundation 
material settled or was 
washed away 
Slipping of embankment 
which was due to cutting 
of deep, narrow channel 
by flood waters 
I 
c 
c 
u 
F 
Recommendations 
Bridge should have 
been analyzed after 
accident, while 
traffic suspended 
Details which may 
appear to be in-
significant must not 
be overlooked 
Consider irnpac t 
caused by concrete 
pour and importance 
of adequate false-
work 
More consideration 
to be given to 
foundation stability 
Sufficient prelim-
inary investigations 
into soil condition 
prior to design 
.... 
N 
00 
Table 3. (Continued) 
Year of 
Bridge 
Chester 
River 
Palm Beach 
Arch 
Tacoma., 
Washington 
failure Failure 
1921 Collapse of canti-
lever sidewalk 
1922 
1923 
Three barrel arch 
spans collapsed 
due to pier failures 
Open crack appeared 
at construction joint 
of arch bridge; there 
was no col lapse 
General 
Cause 
c lassifica-
tion of 
cause 
Apparent old fracture 
of supporting 
bracket 
I 
Very poor concrete and I 
insufficient reinforcing 
steel in piers, inadequate 
rock foundation 
Loss of bond at construc-
tion joint due to foreign 
material 
c 
Lincoln 
Highway 
Bascule 
1928 Counterweight dropped Overstressed counter- D 
Hasse lt 1938 
into river weight tower 
Collapse of 
Vierendeel truss 
bridge 
Brittle fracture as result B 
of high carbon content of 
steel and residual stresses 
resulting from poor quality 
welds 
Recommendations 
Maintenance inspec-
tion must be given 
greater considera-
tion 
Inspection must re-
quire adequate con-
struction procedures 
Proper bond must be 
acquired and pre-
cautions taken in 
regard to foreign 
matter in joint 
Must consider 
dynamic stresses 
during movable 
bridge operation 
Designer must have 
sufficient knowledge 
in design of struc-
tures of high 
strength steel 
Table 3. 
Bridge 
Custer 
Creek 
Tacoma 
Narrows 
(Continued) 
Year of 
failure Failure 
1938 Bridge collapsed 
along with passenger 
train during flash-
flood 
1940 Collapse of suspen-
sion bridge span 
under severe oscil-
lation 
Germany' s 1940 Collapse of canti-
levered steel girder 
during construction 
Frankenthal 
Hartford 1941 
Blue stone 1949 
River 
Collapse of steel 
girder spans during 
construction; failure 
of temporary pier 
Collapse of canti-
levered truss during 
construction 
Cause 
Undermining of pier 
footing which was sup-
ported on gravel 
Inadequate design 
for aerodynamic forces 
Erection of cantilever 
longer than specified 
in design plans 
Undetermined; possibly 
caused by shifting of 
foundation material 
Undetermined; possibly 
caused by motion of 
traveler derrick 
General 
classifica-
tion of 
cause 
F 
D 
c 
u 
u 
Recormnendations 
Pier footings should 
not be supported by 
gravel; piles should 
be driven as support 
for the structure 
when required 
Sufficient wind 
tunne 1 tests must 
be required in 
flexible structures 
Alteration of design 
plans must not be 
permitted without 
approval of design 
engineer 
Consideration should 
be given to support-
ing medium for 
temporary as well as 
permanent piers 
Erect cantilever 
from both piers 
simultaneously to 
eliminate excessive 
loading 
,_. 
w 
0 
Table 3. (Continued) 
Year of 
Bridge failure Failure 
Duplessis 1951 Collapse of welded 
steel girder bridge 
Second 1956 Collapse of canti-
Narrows lever span during 
construction 
Peace 
River 
Big 
Sioux 
River 
1957 
1962 
Collapse of suspen-
sion bridge 
Bridge on Inter-
state 29 over Big 
Sioux River col-
lapsed during high 
flooding 
Cause 
Brittle fracture as 
a result of very cold 
temperatures and 
faulty material 
Faulty grillage of 
temporary pier 
Deterioration of shale 
at one abutment into 
which anchorage block 
was keyed 
General 
classifica-
tion of 
cause 
B 
D 
F 
Undermining of a pier by 
flood waters; sufficient 
preliminary study was 
not obtained 
F 
Recommendations 
Designer must con-
sider temperature of 
the area and design 
to keep brittleness 
to a minimum 
Adequate design 
checks required 
Ample consideration 
to deterioration 
must be given when 
shale is supporting 
ITtaterial; deteriora-
tion of shale often 
takes place when ex-
posed to air or 
water 
Adequate maintenance 
inspection of pier 
foundation, especial-
ly during flooding 
Table 3. 
Bridge 
Kings 
Point 
Pleasant 
(Continued) 
Year of 
failure Failure 
1962 Partial collapse of 
welded girder bridge 
1967 Collapse of sus-
pension bridge 
Cause 
Brittle fracture as a 
result of low notch 
ductility, variable 
carbon content in the 
steel and lack of 
knowledge in welding 
of high strength steel 
Undetermined; under in-
vestigation at time of 
this writing 
General 
classifica-
tion of 
cause 
B 
u 
Recommendations 
Laboratory tests 
must be made to 
determine proper-
ties; sufficient 
knowledge of brittle 
fracture criteria is 
essential 
An assessment should 
be made regarding 
inspection and 
maintenance practices 
throughout United 
States 
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design engineer. A check is also made of the shop drawings which are 
made up by the steel fabricators. This check is necessary to prevent 
costly delays during erection or possibly faulty construction. The 
designer often has competent personnel make inspections at the fabrica-
tors before it is shipped to the construction site. This often results 
in a savings to the owner. 
This procedure is a great improvement over that used prior to 
about 1940. During that period the designer only made stress diagrams 
of the bridge and the remainder of the project was the responsibility 
of the fabricator, the inspector, and the bridge contractor. Much of 
the inspector's time was used in calculating actual stresses in the 
completed portion of the structure as the erection progressed. The 
inspector today has much more of an opportunity to view each operation 
during construction. 
It would be ideal if a bridge design engineer could be permitted 
to spend some time as an inspector during the construction period. 
Also, it would be advantageous for the inspector to gain knowledge of 
the design procedures in the office. This would appear to be of great 
value, as it would possibly reveal significant factors which otherwise 
would be hidden by routine procedures. 
It is quite certain that many failures are never made known, even 
today, to the general public; especially those which appear to be of 
minor significance and probably little or no loss of life. However, 
the bridge failures discussed should permit the reader to become more 
aware of the many factors which may lead to failure. Bridge failures 
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today, when compared with the number of bridges constructed, are 
definitely fewer percentagewise, and probably numerically, than in 
previous years. It should be noted that although the number of failures 
has been reduced in recent years, several factors which have not been 
too critical in the past may not become significant. These are brittle 
fracture and fatigue. With the increased use of high strength steels 
and the resulting increases in aliowable stresses, both of these factors 
will need to be considered more critically. In fact, brittle fracture 
has already been a problem and was the cause of three of the failures 
reported herein. Fatigue will certainly become more of a problem in 
the future as loads increase and higher truck traffic densities occur. 
Bridges will approach critical fatigue much sooner. 
Probably the most valuable information that may be obtained from 
this thesis is the circumstances surrounding the failures and the fact 
that these various types of failures do occur. This knowledge is 
certainly of great value as the first major item of design should be 
a summary of the factors affecting design which, if not considered, may 
have tragic results. 
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APPENDIX 
Brittle Fracture and its Relationship 
to Bridge Failures 
Several failures have resulted from causes about which substantial 
research data and knowledge are now known. One of these failure types 
is brittle fracture. The failures which have been discussed show us 
that lessons can be learned from actual brittle fractures. Although 
mistakes are frequently very costly they are probably the best lessons 
learned and are remembered. Combining the information learned from all 
these sources, it is hoped that failures by brittle fracture can be sig-
nificantly reduced. 
The commonly measured properties of structural steels, such as 
ultimate strength, yield strength and elongation do not always assure 
freedom from failure at low temperatures, especially in la.i:ge .steel 
structures. Failure sometimes occurs under these conditions at stresses 
below the design stresses. Resistance to initiation of cracks called 
"notch toughness" is a characteristic very important in design, fabrica-
tion and construction. 
The opposite of brittle steel is ductile steel. A ductile material 
has the characteristic of yielding plastically under high stress. A 
structure may behave in a ductile or in a brittle manner depending upon 
the temperature, mechanical condition and resulting stress conditions 
under which it is loaded. The factors contributing to the relative 
ductility or brittleness are: 1) material; 2) temperature; 3) velocity 
145 
of deformation and 4) state of stress (111). 
Ductility and brittleness are important characteristics also in 
other metals such as molybdenum, tungsten, and zinc and in non-metals 
such as tar and glass. Tar is a good example of brittle fracture under 
the conditions of temperature and velocity of deformation. Tar will 
flow plastically when a load is applied to it, if at a relatively high 
temperature and if the load is applied slowly. But, if the temperature 
is low or load applied rapidly, a brittle fracture may occur. Whether 
a material will flow plastically or fracture in a brittle manner depends 
upon the ratio of maximum shear stress to the maximum tensile stress and 
the flow and fracture characteristics of the material. An increase in 
the carbon content of steel will decrease its ductility and the yield 
strength is also increased. As the yield strength approaches the frac-
ture strength, the steel becomes more and more brittle. Brittle behavior 
can take place by retarding plastic flow. This is done by increasing 
the carbon content, loading at a rapid rate or introducing notches. 
A steel structure may be made stronger by using higher strength 
steel rather than to increase the size of the members, but when higher 
strength steels are used the structure becomes much more susceptible to 
failure if any notches appear. It has been shown that an increase of 
0.10 per cent of carbon will raise the temperature at which brittle 
fracture can take place by 25° to 50° F. When conditions are present 
which could cause brittle failure, steels of lower carbon content are 
usually used. 
Any condition that will cause a low ratio of maximum shear stress to 
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maximum tensile stress should be avoided. These conditions can occur in 
design by introducing unfavorable stresses in a structure and also by 
notches introduced during fabrication or construction. Some examples 
are: incompletely penetrated weld joints, weld cracks, base metal or 
under bead cracks and accidental notches. 
An explanation of the effects of notches on brittle steel may be 
useful to the reader. When a tensile stress is applied to a plate without 
any notches the stress is uniform across the width of the plate. When 
a notch is present as shown in Figure 22 a high stress is concentrated at 
the apex of the notch and drops instantly to zero. Experiments show 
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Figure 22. Diagram of notched plate showing longitudinal stress 
distribution (111) 
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that thicker plates with notches will fracture at lower temperatures 
than the thinner plates when under the same stress conditions. This is 
because in the thicker plate, once a crack starts to form at the apex of 
the notch there is a component of much higher stress in the thickness 
direction of the plate. At the same time the longitudinal tensile stress 
concentration factor is the same in the thicker plate as in the thinner 
plate. The reason for the component of higher stress in the thicker 
plate is due to the fact that the stress can reach a higher point before 
it begins to decrease and reaches zero at the edge (see Figure 23). The 
variation in the stress component along the width is also shown. The 
stress concentration at the apex of a notch is quite unfavorable and 
becomes more so with an increase in plate thickness and sharpness of 
notch. 
The effect a notch has on a steel depends on many factors, one of 
which is temperature. When a steel is used for design of a structure 
extensive tests should be made at various temperatures because there is 
no exact answer for the notch effect on brittleness of a particular steel. 
A representative sample should be tested for notch toughness for each 
member in the structure which will be subjected to a large tensile 
stress. 
With a given geometry and for a specific strain rate there is a 
temperature above which brittle fractures will not occur in mild steel. 
This is called the "transition temperature." This transition tempera-
ture occurs slowly in some steels and abruptly in others. This should 
also be considered in laboratory tests if the location of a particular 
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structure is in an area of relatively low temperatures for any short 
period of time. This apparently was not a factor in the failure of the 
Kings Bridge in Melbourne, Australia. The transition temperature can be 
raised considerably with the addition of carbon. Phosphorous also is 
very effective in raising the transition temperature. The temperature 
effect played a part in the failure of the Duplessis Bridge at Three 
Rivers, Quebec and was aggravated by the use of poor quality steel with 
impurities and variable carbon content which would make laboratory tests 
quite meaningless. 
Another factor which can change the brittle characteristic of a 
steel is the welding operation. Although failure of a structure made up 
of brittle material does not usually occur because of defects in weld it 
is important for the designer to know and understand the effects of poor 
weldability on brittle steel. Under quality control it is possible to 
apply a weld to a steel which is stronger than the base metal. 
The problems of weldability are of two types one is joinability 
and the other is serviceability. The joinability is dependent on the 
ability of the construction welder and serviceability, which deals with 
the mechanical performance of the weldments, is governed by the chemical 
composition, microstructure, and the structural discontinuities. The 
chemical composition is controlled by selection of the electrode type 
and the welding procedure. The microstructure is a function of the 
cooling rate and the structural discontinuities are dependent upon the 
design of the joint and skill of the welder. 
The elements of which the weld material is made can greatly affect 
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the quality of the welded joint. Usually the carbon content of mild 
steel welds is only about 0.1 per cent and manganese is at a high level, 
which accounts for a ductile weld. Gases such as oxygen, nitrogen, and 
hydrogen are often the cause of a poor quality weld. The skill of the 
welder is very important in keeping the presence of gas bubbles to a 
minimum. The use of submerged arc welding is used today quite extensive-
ly and is quite effective in this respect. 
The microstructure of a weld is controlled by the chemical composi-
tion and the cooling rate. An increase in the cooling rate decreases 
the quality of the weld and increases the brittleness and existence of 
defects in the weld. The importance of good quality welds can not be 
overlooked. There should be extensive inspection of welds both by sight 
and by magnetic particle inspection to detect any defects in the weld 
below the surface. 
Whether or not residual stresses caused by welding are a contribut-
ing factor in brittle fractures is not fully known. Residual stresses, 
however, in general are sometimes a serious matter if the material at 
that point is already highly stressed, Therefore the possibility of 
residual stresses must be considered in design. The residual stresses 
can be relieved by several methods which will be included in the follow-
ing discussion. 
It is commonly thought by those who are not aware of what actually 
takes place during heating of a metal, that residual stresses are set up 
only by the shrinkage of the weld. A discussion as to what actually 
takes place when a metal is heated to a very high temperature and a high 
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temperature gradient would be quite beneficial at this point. When a 
flat metal is heated at a small area to about 700° F the heated portion 
expands radially outward and is resisted by the cool portion of the 
plate. This results in biaxial compressive stresses in the heated por-
tion with the stresses greatest in the latter portion of the plate. With 
the expansion of the metal, plastic flow takes place which can occur only 
in a direction perpendicular to the plane of the steel plate. This 
causes the thickness to increase with most of the added thickness still 
remaining after the steel is cooled. However, the volume of the steel 
must be the same after heating as before, with the result of shortening 
in radial directions of the heated spot. This causes tensile stresses to 
remain in the metal along radial lines from the heated spot. This same 
effect can be produced either by using a torch or by welding operation. 
Quite often web plates for welded girder bridges are butt welded 
when a longer plate is required than that produced by a rolling mill. 
This butt joint weld is a good example of residual stresses and must not 
occur at a point in the span wh~re large stresses may occur. A zone of 
tensile stress occurs along the weld and parallel to the weld to a dis-
tance into the plate several times the width of the weld. Beyond this 
there is compressive stress with the maximum value about one-fifth the 
yield strength of the steel being welded. The tensile stress in the 
vicinity of the weld may go as high as 60,000 psi. 
The stresses which occur across a weld are not very serious in un-
restrained plates and may induce stresses up to 5,000 psi although when 
a welded portion is restrained as in a pressure vessel the problem is 
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somewhat more serious. In fact the residual stress may be as high as 
the yield strength of the metal. Patterns of these two types of residual 
stress problems are shown in Figure 24. 
Residual stresses may be relieved by two methods. One method is by 
thermal means and the other is by mechanical means. The thermal method 
consists of heating the welded assembly to 1100-1200° F and holding that 
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Figure 24. Diagram of butt welded steel plate and typical residual 
stress pattern (111) 
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temperature for two or three hours, then cooling very slowly. The 
residual stresses within the metal are relieved by plastic flow or 
creep with a uniform stress being obtained through the heated area. 
Also by this heat treatment the more brittle steel in the weld region 
is toughened by an alteration of the microstructure produced by exposure 
to very high temperature. Mechanical stress relieving is done by stretch-
ing plastically the regions containing tension stresses caused initially 
by shortening. 
A welded structure is much more susceptible to failure than a 
riveted structure. There is not the problem of residual stresses caused 
by heat in a riveted structure. If a crack occurs in a riveted joint 
there is a good chance that the crack may be terminated at a rivet where-
as in a welded joint the crack is almost sure to continue. 
There is no sure factor of safety for design especially if the 
steel is of a brittle nature. The method of laboratory testing of a 
representative sample of the material would be the only means of obtain-
ing a somewhat reasonable criteria for design purposes. The number of 
welded structures that fail are small but even so the great expense in-
curred by those very few may be large and seems unnecessary, neverthe-
less. 
A further concept of brittle strength is given by use of the follow-
ing graph which explains the transition range from ductile behavior at 
high temperatures to brittle behavior at lower temperatures. The three 
graphs shown in the following diagram (Figure 25) are yield strength "Y", 
brittle strength "B", and flow stress in the presence of a notch "3Y". 
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Figure 25. Transition from ductile behavior to brittle be-
havior (113) 
"3Y" represents three times the yield strength "Y". These graphs are 
plotted as functions of temperatures. It is indicated that above the 
temperature T2 , the point when "B" intersects "3Y", the material will be 
fully ductile with or without a notch and below T
1 
where "B" intersects 
"Y" the material will always fracture in a brittle manner. The transi-
tion zone is where the material will act in a ductile manner under uni-
axial stress and in a brittle manner if a notch is present. Failure may 
take place before three times the yield strength has been reached if a 
notch is present. 
In 1951 an important piece of research was published by Eldin and 
Collins (113) on the fracture and yield stress of 1020 steel at 
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temperatures in the region near absolute zero (12° K, or -438° F) and up 
to 185° K (-126° F). All tests were made using uniaxial tension and no 
notches. It was found that from 12° K (-438° F) to 61.5° K (-346° F) 
all specimens fail as a brittle fracture. This fracture took place with 
no reduction in the area of the specimens. As the temperature was in-
creased above 61.5° K reduction of area took place and a yield stress 
could be measured. When the temperature reached 104° K (-272° F) the 
fracture indicated the presence of ductile material and above 185° K 
0 (-126 F) all the fractures were shear. 
There are two conditions requisite to a brittle failure. First, the 
rate of stress application and strain rate must be high enough to bring 
the yield stress of the material up to the brittle strength without in-
traducing any triaxial stresses and second, sufficient plastic deforma-
tion is induced at the tip of a crack, so that approximately three times 
the yield strength exceeds the brittle strength of the material. These 
two conditions may occur together to accomplish a fracture where alone 
neither condition is sufficient. 
It is shown in Figure 26 how the material varies between the ductile 
state and the brittle state with a transition range between. The energy 
absorbed is plotted against the three conditions which affect the rela-
tive change from one side of the graph to the other. 
It is shown that the material may fail in a brittle manner with very 
little energy absorption if the temperature is decreased, the loading 
rate increased, and increasing transverse stresses. 
In the design of structures there are many points of large stress 
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Figure 26. Diagram showing effect of temperature, rate of loading 
and transverse stresses on the type of failure (113) 
concentration where the actual stresses may not be determined. This may 
create quite a serious problem in the event of brittle material. In 
orde~ for reliable stress calculations to be made, the strains must be 
in the elastic range for a fairly large area. Dependence must be placed 
on some structure existing under somewhat the same conditions. It may 
be unknown whether that structure is performing well due to a precise 
knowledge of the stress condition or whether it is due to the material 
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having the ability to yield properly in the zone in question. Much of 
the knowledge gained in the past regarding brittle failures can be used 
in design of a structure only as an approximation as to when brittle 
fractures may occur and what precautions should be taken to guard against 
brittle failure. Laboratory tests of the actual material or a representa-
tive sample should be made. 
Structural steel may become brittle at low temperatures especially 
in the presence of a notch. Notches may occur during fabrication or 
erection. If a crack starts at a notch, greater toughness is necessary 
to stop the crack than is required to prevent one from starting. There-
fore, a good designer would make the area of stress concentration lie 
within a tough material which could prevent the start of a crack. 
It is the viewpoint of many designers that an area which may be 
overstressed due to a condition such as a notch, will relieve its stresses 
by yielding. This is not always true when viewed with the possibilities 
of brittleness under certain conditions. 
A ductile material will always show signs of decreasing in cross-
sectional area during yielding when subjected to an axial load. If the 
material is restrained from deforming and would remain at the original 
cross-section there could be no yielding as the volume must always re-
main the same. If an increment is stretched, the volume within the 
original increment must be the same after stretching as before, there-
fore the cross-section must decrease accordingly. If the material is 
under triaxial loading until the breaking point is reached the result 
wi 11 be a brittle fracture . 
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If in a steel structure there is a notch in an area under tension, 
the apex of the notch will probably reach the yield stress. If the 
material adjacent to the notch apex restricts any lateral deformation, 
the material will be in a brittle state even though the material may be 
ductile. The thicker plates are more susceptible to brittle fracture in 
the presence of a notch because of the same principle. There is more of 
a resistance to any yielding and there is little or no elongation of the 
material at the notch. 
A material, therefore, may be ductile but if placed in a structure 
such that yielding is restrained brittleness may result. An example of 
lateral restraint is shown in Figure 27. 
The narrow section tends to get smaller in cross-section but is 
restrained by the thicker portion adjacent to it. The results will be 
t t t 
Lateral 
restraint 
Figure 27. Diagram of notched test bar (23) 
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brittle fracture when the axial loading reaches the breaking point of the 
steel. Actually the steel could be under a relatively low stress. 
Today many large structures of steel are welded ~ather than riveted. 
A riveted joint may act as shown in Figure 28. The plates are under 
uniaxial stress only due to the deforming of the angles. This differs 
from a similar welded joint as shown in the same figure. The tension 
force on each of the plates tends to create lateral forces within the 
through plates at the welded joint preventing the plate from narrowing. 
As a result there can be little or no yielding of the through plate and 
a brittle fracture may take place. Within a welded structure a three-
dimensional continuity may be built in and form what may be called acute 
rigidity or absence of flexibility. 
t t 
Figure 28. Diagram of riveted and welded joints (23) 
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Steel is a very versatile material and because of this brittleness 
is a problem. Steel can always be fabricated into a structure without any 
loss of its properties if done correctly and with care. It is quite sim-
ple to get 100 per cent joint efficiency with a simple welding operation 
but nevertheless care must also be taken. This sometimes leads us into 
the problem of brittleness. If 100 per cent joint efficiency could not be 
obtained this problem would not exist. Also if riveting were more effi-
cient we would probably have no problem with brittleness. Therefore care 
must always be taken and all possibilities which could lead to brittleness 
must be considered very carefully because brittleness can be designed 
into a structure. 
As discussed somewhat previously the matter of rapidly applying loads 
may cause the material to be brittle when otherwise it would be a ductile 
material. If a notch is present this problem is even more great. A sharp 
notch is said to have a stress concentration factor of three. This means 
that if we apply a 10,000 psi average stress to the notched structure, the 
stress at the notch apex will be 30,000 psi. If it took 3 seconds to ap-
ply this 10,000 psi stress, then it only took 1 second for the stress at 
the notch to reach 10,000 psi. Therefore 30,000 psi was being applied at 
the notch during the same time that the remainder of the structure was re-
ceiving 10,000 psi. Within the vicinity of a notch the strain rate is 
therefore increased. 
All the previous points discussed which can lead to brittleness can 
be serious and must be given much thought by a designer and also the 
fabricator and.erector. These points are all made even more serious if 
the temperature is low. A good explanation of what takes place with a 
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variation in temperature is shown in Figure 29. 
An important fact to be considered in the event of brittle material 
occurring is the crack initiation or crack propagation. A laboratory 
test which is used to determine a material's ability to resist cracking 
initiation and propagation is the Charpy Impact Test. Once a crack is 
started it sometimes takes a very low stress to affect the continuation 
of the crack. The Charpy Impact Test is accomplished by the use ofa blow 
striking a sample of the material in which there is a standard notch. 
The force of the impact is measured in foot pounds. A graphical example 
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of what takes place within a material under varying temperatures and 
loads is shown i~ Figure 30. 
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Figure 30. Diagram showing a typical impact-transition temperature 
curve (23) 
The specimens under the conditions at the far right do not break 
easily nor in a clean manner. They more or less bend and tear. The 
ones at the left break clean and suddenly. The specimens in the center 
are within the transition range where a crack is hard to start but once 
started it is hard to stop. 
In the design of a steel structure it must be considered whether 
the conditions leading to brittleness may be present. A designer should 
163 
ask himself certain questions to determine whether or not the risk of 
brittle fracture is serious and requires special design consideration. 
The following questions and answers are very important and must be given 
considerable amount of thought (23). 
1. What is the minimum anticipated service temperature? 
The lower the temperature, the greater the susceptibility to brittle 
fracture. 
2. Are tension stresses involved? 
Brittle fracture can occur only under condition of tensile stress. 
3. How thick is the material? 
The thicker the steel, the greater the susceptibility to brittle 
fracture. 
4. Is there three-cli.mensional continuity? 
Three-dimensional continuity tends to restrain the steel from 
yielding and increases suceptibility to brittle fracture. 
5. Are notches present? 
The presence of a notch increases susceptibility to brittle fracture. 
6. Are multiaxial stress conditions likely to occur? 
Multiaxial stresses will tend to restrain yielding and increase sus-
ceptibility to brittle fracture. 
7. Is loading applied at a high rate? 
The higher the rate of loading, the greater susceptibility to brittle 
fracture. 
8. Is there a changing rate of stress? 
Brittle fracture occurs only under conditions of increasing rate 
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of stress. 
9. Is welding involved? 
Weld cracks can act as severe notches. 
10. Are there riveted or bolted seams that would stop a crack and 
prevent a disastrous failure? 
A characteristic of ductility is its capability of the material 
to flow plastically. This plastic flow is dependent only on the shear 
stresses, and the maximum shear stress is equal to one-half of the dif-
ference between the maximum and minimum principal stresses. In a tri-
axial stress system the ratio of maximum shear stress to maximum tensile 
stress can range from zero to greater than one. This ratio determines 
whether or not a steel will behave in a brittle or a ductile manner. If 
the ratio is low the tendency will be towards brittleness. 
When an unnotched specimen of mild steel is tested at liquid nitro-
gen temperature, it will be as brittle as cast-iron if subjected to a 
tensile loading and as ductile as copper if loaded in torsion. The 
ratio of maximum shear stress to maximum tensile stress is one-half for 
the tensile test and one for the torsion test. 
The only way this ratio can be made smaller than one-half is by use 
of a notch and the ratio depends upon the sharpness of the notch and the 
plate thickness. In laboratory tests the easiest and most common means 
of determining the brittleness characteristics of a steel is by use of a 
notched specimen. The evaluation of results and selection of tests are to 
compare with the service performance of the structure. 
The appearance of the fracture surface is quite different from a 
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brittle (cleavage) fracture to a ductile (shear) fracture. Shear is 
accompanied by plastic flow. This forms voids in the atomic structure 
of the steel and increases as the plastic flow increases. The voids in-
crea.,e to a point where a fracture takes place. A shear failure follows 
a diagonal path across the crystals which make up the material. 
A brittle fracture or cleavage fracture follows the plane of the 
crystals. This fracture does not involve plastic flow. A very small 
amount is sometimes present -- usually only a fraction of one percent. 
At high temperatures the cleavage strength is high relative to shear 
fracture strength, and the reverse is true at low temperatures. The 
transition from one to the other depends on the ratio of maximum shear 
stress to maximum tensile stress. When the ratio is one, as in torsion, 
the transition is below -300° F for mild steel; when it is one-half, 
0 transition occurs at about -250 F, and the transition for notched speci-
mens occurs in the normal ambient temperature range. 
The appearance of the two types of fractures is important for identi-
fication. Shear failures appear gray and silky while cleavage failures 
appear bright and granular. A cleavage failure usually leaves a herring-
bone fracture on the surface of a steel plate with poi.nts in the direc-
tion of the source of failure. 
As previously discussed, the rate of loading contributes to brittle-
ness. This is explained by the fact that it takes time for plastic flow 
to take place. Plastic flow must take place in order to yield. If the 
load comes on the member at a rapid enough rate, there is not time for 
yielding and cleavage fracture results. 
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Welding is known to have an effect on brittle behavior of a metal. 
This effect is usually caused by defective welds which leave notches 
permitting brittle fractures to start. Also welds provide three dimen-
sional continuity and plate-to-plate continuity necessary for continuous 
crack propagation. 
Notch ductility is decreased by a rapid rate of cooling of the weld. 
Therefore preheating of the material to be welded is sometimes done and 
also light fillet welds are to be avoided if possible as cooling is much 
faster than in a heavier weld. Post heating is sometimes used to retard 
the cooling process and this works quite we 11 in most cases. Usually a 
temperature of 1100-1200° F is obtained. 
A weld specimen to be tested for relative brittleness should consist 
of a portion of the two metals welded for the full length. A notch 
should be placed across the weld, the heat affected zone, and the base 
plate. 
A further complication of welding is the residual stresses which 
exist due to the high temperature to which the metal was exposed. The 
reason for the residual stresses and how they take place has been dis-
cussed previously. The actual effect that residual stresses have on 
brittle behavior is not certain. Some feel that a very slight amount of 
plastic flow will relieve any residual stress. Welding stresses can be 
effectively relieved by furnace heating to 1100-1200° F. Also some 
stress relieving has been found to take place by low temperature. 
The brittle behavior of steel will continue to plague engineers 
for years to come but the knowledge which has been gained through 
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past failures and laboratory experiments will greatly help to 
reduce failures in the future if it can be brought to the attention of 
the designer, the fabricator and the construction workers. All have a 
part to play in the completion of sound structures, such as steel 
bridges, pipelines, and buildings. Brittle failures may never be 
entirely eliminated, but proper precaution based on proper knowledge of 
the causes can help to reduce the failures significantly. 
Analysis of Suspension Bridge Failures 
It was concluded by the board investigating the failure of the 
Tacoma Narrows Suspension Bridge that there was no faulty mater.ial in 
the bridge nor had there been faulty workmanship (56). The design was 
adequate to carry the loads which were used in the design of other 
previous suspension bridges. The problem in this bridge was that the 
stiffening girders along with the narrow roadway were, for the size of 
the span, too flexible to withstand the aerodynamic forces. There was 
insufficient capacity for damping and for dissipating energy built up 
by wind forces. The initial failure took place due to the slipping of 
a cable band on the north side of the bridge. This magnified the tor-
sional action to the point of failure of one of the ties at the center 
of the span. An out-of-phase oscillating motion took place which in-
creased to extreme amounts with subsequent breaking of suspenders. 
The question of aerodynamic action on suspension bridges was con-
sidered quite extensively in the study of this bridge failure by the 
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investigating board. It had not been realized that the aerodynamic 
forces would affect a structure of such magnitude, although its flexi-
bility was far in excess of that of comparable suspension bridges. The 
bridge was well designed for static forces but the criteria for static 
forces does not always apply to dynamic forces. 
Several methods were used to dampen the oscillation due to wind 
forces but they were quite ineffective. The means used for damping were: 
hydraulic jacks at the towers placed at the ends of the floor system; 
stay ropes placed diagonally from the center of the main span cable to 
the stiffening girder; and stay ropes placed from the top of the towers 
to the floor system. The flexibility of the span was so great that the 
above systems for damping were quite ineffective. 
A study was made of similar suspension bridges before the Tacoma 
Narrows Bridge was designed and the need for damping was considered 
necessary. Models also were built in the laboratory and the need for 
damping was discovered. The methods had been used in\ similar but smaller 
suspension bridges, but apparently with less relative flexibility than 
the Tacoma Narrows Bridge. Details of this study are given in Refer-
ence 56, but are summarized very briefly in the following paragraphs. 
In a wide and more rigid suspension bridge the transverse tilting 
of the floor and the resulting torsional stresses in the floor caused by 
non-uniform distribution of live load and eccentrically applied wind 
forces would be negligible. In this narrow and flexible bridge the 
problem became a major one and required investigating. Under normal 
loading the tilting of the floor system was considerably greater than 
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in other bridges which were studied. See Figure 31 for comparative 
tilting of the floors. 
The investigating board made comparisons of the twisting or tilting 
of the bridge floors of several designs under two different loading condi-
tions. The first loading condition was the application of a torsional 
moment of 10,000 ft-lbs per lineal ft. of bridge from the tower to mid-
span. The results of the comparison of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge with 
other suspension bridges is shown in Table 4. 
The second comparison is based on the floor tilt resulting from a 
loading of 100 lb. per ft. on the near cable from the tower to mid-span 
and the same load on the far cable from mid-span to the other tower. 
These results are shown in Table 5 and Figures 32 and 33. 
The ability of a suspension bridge to resist irregular and turbulent 
wind forces is reflected by their torsional deformations under these 
assumed loads. The application of 10,000 ft-lbs per ft. of bridge was 
applied to all the suspension bridges listed regardless of width. The 
George Washington Bridge, for example, required a load of 94.3 lbs. per 
ft. up on one cable and down on the other cable. These forces with a 
distance of 106 ft. between produced a torsional moment of 10,000 ft-lbs 
per foot. The Tacoma Bridge with a width between cables of only 39 ft. 
required 256 lb. per ft. applied to the cables to produce a torsional 
moment of 10,000 ft-lbs per foot. This comparison resulted in a tilt of 
38 times that of the George Washington Bridge. If the moment had been 
proportioned according to width the result would only have been llf times 
as great instead of 38. 
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a 
Table 4. Comparison of torsional deformation of Tacoma Narrows Bridge 
with others (56) 
Ratio of rota-
ti on of Tacoma 
b c d e Rota- as built, 
Bridge ti on to others 
,. 
Tacoma, as built 39 2.564 3. 18 8.154 .2091 1.0 to 1 
Tacoma, fully 
braced design 39 2.564 . 296 ,760 .0195 10.7 to 1 
Toledo 59 1. 695 .26 .441 .0075 27.9 to lf 
George Washington 106 . 943 .62 . 585 .0055 38.0 to lg 
Bronx-Whitestone 
with stays 74 1. 351 1.08 1.459 .0196 10.7 to lg 
Bronx-Whitestone 
without stays 74 1.351 1.22 1.648 .0223 9.4 to lg 
Transbay 66 1. 515 . 80 1.212 .0184 11.4 to lg 
Golden Gate 90 1.111 1. 36 1.511 .0168 12.4 to lh 
American Crossing 
li Thousand Islands 30.5 3.279 1.54 5.050 .1656 1. 3 to 
Deer Is le 23.5 4.255 2. 92 12.424 
i 
.5287 .4 to 1 
aBased on deflections at quarter point of loaded half of span due to 
a torsional moment of 10,000 ft-lb per ft. of bridge from tower to mid-
span. 
bWidth c. to c. cables, in feet. 
c Load per lin, ft. of cab le, up on near cab le and down on far cab le, 
in units of 100 lb. 
dDifference in deflection, in feet, at quarter point of loaded half 
of span due to loads of 100 lb. per lin. ft. of cable from tower to mid-
span up on near cable and down on far cable. 
eDifference in deflection of two cables. 
f data furnished by Waddell and Hardesty. Based on 
gBased on data given in Ammann, von Karman, Woodruff report. 
hBased on data furnished by Clifford E. Paine. 
iBased on data furnished by Robinson and Steinman. 
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Table 5. Comparison of torsional flexibility of Tacoma Narrows Bridgea 
with others (56) 
Deflections in feet 
at cable 
Cable 
spacing 
in ft. Bridge Down Up Diff. 
Tacoma, as built 1.59 .39 1. 98 39 
Tacoma, fully b 
braced design .690 .612 . 07 8 39 
Toledo .13 .06 .19 59 
George Washington . 31 . 19 . 50 106 
Bronx-Whitestone 
with stays . 54 . 22 . 76 74 
Bronx-Whitestone 
without stays .61 .24 .85 74 
Transbay .40 .29 .69 66 
Golden Gate .68 .36 1. 04 90 
American Crossing 
Thousand Islands .77 .25 1.02 30.5 
Deer Isle 1.46 .45 1.91 23.5 
Rota-
tion 
.0508 
.0020 
.0032 
.0047 
.0103 
. 0115 
.0105 
.0116 
.0334 
.0813 
Ratio of rota-
tion of Tacoma 
as built, 
to others 
1. 0 to 1 
25.4 to 1 
c 
15.9 to 1 
d 
10.8 to 1 
d 
4.9 to 1 
d 
4.4 to 1 
4. 8 to 1 d 
4.4 to le 
f 
1. 5 to 1 
. 6 to 1 f 
aliased on tilting of floor in main span at quarter points from load 
of 100 lb. per ft. on near cable from tower to mid-span and the same load 
on far cable from mid-span to other tower. 
b Down. 
cBased on data furnished by Waddell and Hardesty. 
d 
Based on data given in Ammann, von Karman, Woodruff report. 
eBased on data furnished by Clifford E. Paine. 
£Based on data furnished by Robinson and Steinman. 
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Figure 32. Comparative torsional deformations of ten bridges (56) 
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By use of the second type of loading the results were as shown in 
Table 5 with the tilting of the Tacoma Bridge being 10.8 times that of 
the George Washington Bridge. Also compared is the Tacoma Bridge with a 
cross-section as built and a cross-section fully braced (see Figures 34 
and 35). 
Torsional resistance which is very critical in the design of sus-
pension bridges can be increased by: an increase in weight of the span, 
decreasing the cable sag, increasing the moment of inertia of the stif-
fening trusses, and increasing the width. The effects of these are 
shown in Figure 33. Comparison No. 9 gives the most resistance to tor-
sion which is accounted for by its being fully braced. The fully braced 
design consisted of an open grid deck instead of concrete as used in the 
as-built bridge. It is interesting to note the great increase in No. 8 
with the width increased to 53 ft. and 100 per cent more weight. 
·---···-···· - -I 
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Figure 34. Section through suspended structure of Tacoma Narrows 
Bridge; as built (56) 
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Figure 35. Section through suspended structure of Tacoma Narrows Bridge; fully 
braced design (56) 
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A suspension bridge is much more flexible than other types of 
bridges and the design is therefore very different. A movement of any 
part of the bridge causes a noticeable movement at other points through-
out the entire bridge. The stiffening girders are usually shallow in 
comparison to their length and the rigidity of the structure is dependent 
largely on the dead load for its stabilizing effect. The term rigidity 
is not clearly defined to the structural engineer but it is very important 
to have rigidity in a structure to maintain a stable condition. Rigidity 
in a suspension bridge can refer to resistance to an increase in ampli-
tude, increase in tilting of the deck, as to the acceleration of any 
movement. The amount of rigidity required may depend on the effect of 
motion on those using the bridge and excessive tilting may affect the 
operation of vehicles. Lack of rigidity may cause excessive wear on 
moving parts of the bridge. All these facts must be given consideration 
by the designer. 
Wind is probably the most common cause of vibration in a suspen-
sion bridge and is found to have had a great effect on the Tacoma Bridge 
due to its lack of rigidity. The action of wind on a suspension bridge 
is very complex. Winds are usually treated as uniform static loads on 
a structure but this is not the case as gusts of wind cause very large 
forces and cause turbulent motion. Complex eddies and pressures are 
caused by wind on a fixed bridge but the situation becomes much more 
complicated when the bridge itself moves also. If the movement of the 
bridge is periodic, the pressures from the wind must also be periodic. 
If the pressures are in phase with the periodic movement of the bridge, 
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a condition of self-induced resonance may result which is termed "nega-
tive damping. " 
Vibrations can be somewhat predicted if the conditions causing them 
can be predicted. Vibrations can be computed mathematically or by use 
of models. In the case of vibrations being caused by wind there is very 
unpredictable results from any calculations. If repeated impulses from 
wind throw energy into a vibrating system this vibration must be damped 
as fast as it is produced or resonance results and a build-up may result 
in failure of the structure. Damping may be supplied by the natural 
damping capacity of the structural steel itself, by friction, or by some 
mechanical means. In the Tacoma Narrows Bridge there was insufficient 
damping either in the steel itself or in the mechanical means employed. 
Many cycles of vibration occurred before the amplitude became objection-
able. 
In the Tacoma Bridge only 1 or 2 per cent of the total energy was 
stored in the girders. If the girders had been able to store more energy 
the failure may have been eliminated. The larger and stiffer the girders 
and cross bracing, the more energy will be absorbed and also damped by 
the structural steel in the girders. 
There is a great deal to be learned from past experience and ob-
servations of other suspension bridges. Quite a number of suspension 
bridges have been observed and records made. Some of these along with 
some statistics are shown in Table 6. Much can be learned from observ-
ing structures already in existence, especially with regard to variable 
and unpredictable forces ~s those caused by wind which really has no 
Table 6. Dimensions of suspension bridges with spans of 1200 feet or over (56) 
Dead load Design 
Depth center live 
Width of span load 
Center Side Cable c.c. stiff'g lbs. per lbs. per 
Name and Year span spans sag cable girder ft. of ft. of 
location completed ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. bridge bridge 
Golden Gate 
San Francisco, Cal. 1937 4200 1125 475 90 25 21,600 4,000 
George Washington Ultimate double deck 
New York, N.Y. 1931 3500 610-650 325 106 29 39,000 8,000 
Present single deck ,.... 
31,500 " 
'° 
Tacoma Narrows 
Tacoma, Wash. 1940 2800 1100 232 39 8 5,700 1,000 
Trans bay 
San Francisco, Cal. 1936 2310 1160 231 66 30 18,800 8,000 
Bronx-Whitestone 
New York, N.Y. 1939 2300 735 200 74 11 11,000 3,000 
Ambassador 817-973 
Detroit, Mich. 1929 1850 Unloaded 209 67 22 12 ,400 3,300 
backstays 
Delaware River 
Philadelphia, Pa. 1926 1750 716. 7 197 89 28 26,000 6,000 
Table 6. (Continued) 
Dead load Design 
Depth center live 
Width of span load 
Center Side Cable c.c. stiff'g lbs. per lbs. per 
Name and Year span spans sag cable girder ft. of ft. of 
location completed ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. bridge bridge 
Bear Mountain Unloaded 
West Point, N.Y. 1924 1632 backstays 200 61.3 30 11,540 3, 160 
Wi l liat:tsburg 596 
New York, N.Y. 1903 1600 Unloaded 178 67 40 17,200 5,700 
backstays 
Lions Gate 
Vancou\.rer, B.C. 1938 1550 615 150 40 15 4 ,600 ..... 1,230 co 
0 
Mid Hudson 
Poughkeepsie, N.Y. 1930 1500 750 150 42 20 8,800 3,000 
Nanhattan 
New York, N.Y. 1909 1470 725 148.5 96 24 23,280 8,000 
Triborough 
New York, N.Y. 1936 1380 705 138 98 20 20,000 4 ,000 
St. Johns 
Portland, Ore. 1930 1207 430 121 52 18 
Mount Hope 
Providence, R. I. 1928 1200 504 120 34 18 5,300 1,500 
181 
exact solution. A discussion will be made of several suspension bridges 
with the hope that some designers may be made aware of the critical areas 
in design of suspension bridges. 
The failure of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge was caused by oscillations 
being built up by dynamic wind forces and was aggravated by slipping of 
the stay ropes on the cable. The bridge was well designed for the dead 
load and live loads for which it was to carry but its flexibility was 
much too great when acted upon by variable wind forces. Its behavior can 
only be explained by its response to aerodynamic forces. Extensive 
laboratory experiments were made following the Tacoma Bridge failure 
along with theoretical studies. 
The behavior of comparably large suspension bridges may partially 
explain the action of the Tacoma Bridge. Of the many similar bridges 
probably the Golden Gate Bridge and the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge have the 
most flexible stiffening girders. They have experienced some effects 
caused by aerodynamic forces. A discussion will be made of five of the 
longest suspension bridges with a comparison of their elastic characteris-
tics and actual behavior. 
The early history of suspension bridges goes back about 150 years 
and it seems as though the design of suspension bridges should have al-
most been mastered if the past designs and their actions had been studied. 
Most of the suspension bridges built in the first half of the 19th century 
were comparatively flexible. Oscillations of large degree were not un-
common in those days. Two accounts of interest follow (56). 
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"A highway bridge of about 400 ft. span over the Elk 
River, near Charleston, West Virginia, is suspended from wire 
cables without any kind of stiffening construction. The 
bridge accommodates a heavy traffic from the adjoining lumber 
region, and the oscillations and undulations of the flow, under 
the moving load of a four-ox lumber wagon, are enough to make 
a person seasick, but without causing an apparent inconven-
ience to the travel of vehicles, and certainly without detri-
ment to the strength and durability of the structure. The 
bridge, as far as the speaker could ascertain, was built long 
before the Civil War; therefore, at the time it came under his 
observation, it had seen at least thirty years service, and it 
was still in an excellent state of preservations." 
A suspension bridge over the Merrimac River near Newburyport, Mass., 
built in 1810 was described in the same article (56) as follows: 
"When, some twelve to fifteen years ago, trolley cars were 
invented, the community owning this bridge did not hesitate to 
permit the crossing of electric cars, without making any change 
or addition to the structure, except to provide it with the neces-
sary girder rails. The effect of a trolley car, weighing, perhaps 
12 to 14 tons, on the unstiffened floor was more appalling to the 
speaker than anything he had ever experienced. Standing at one 
end of the bridge and seeing a car enter at the other end, it 
seemed suddenly to vanish from sight, giving the impression that 
the bridge was breaking down, but in a few moments the car 
emerged again, and after it had reached the opposite end of the 
bridge assumed its usual shape and appearance, as though it had 
never been disturbed. Actual measurement showed that the car 
caused a local deflection of about 20 inches in one quarter of 
the span, and a corresponding rise in the opposite quarter. The 
combination of the depression and rise projected on the car 
produced the impression that the car was gradually vanishing from 
sight. The speaker made a careful examination of all parts of 
the bridge, and found them in perfect condition and of ample 
strength for sustaining the loads." 
There are many reports of failures in early suspension bridges. 
These failures were caused by wind, or moving loads. There is one failure 
due to marching of troops which produced synchronized oscillation of the 
structure. 
Most of the early bridges were built of timber and were of very 
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light construction. Very little was known about the effects of wind 
forces on the structure and causes were usually attributed to structural 
failure, material'defects, or poor maintenance. The only means of stif-
fening was the weight of the floor and the railings. Stay ropes were 
quite common at that time. Some of the failures of early suspension 
bridges were discussed previously in the article describing the failure 
of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge (62). 
The action of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge cannot be compared with 
any of these early bridges because they were of much shorter spans and 
the weights much less. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to know that the 
problem of flexibility is not one brought about in the most recent bridges. 
The flexibility became objectionable in the second half of the 19th 
century from the traffic point of view and this led to more stiffening. 
This was the major purpose for stiffening even into the 20th century. 
Oscillation and excessive deformations became a matter of concern but 
still very little was known about oscillations due to dynamic wind ac-
tion. The only design criteria regarding wind was an assumed amount of 
static pressure. 
As the elastic theory began to develop the emphasis was being placed 
on deep girders or stiffening trusses. The Williamsburg Bridge across 
the East River in New York, which was completed in 1904, had a stiffening 
truss of 40 ft. deep. This was to comply with the design specification 
of the depth being not less than 1/40 of the span length, its span 
being 1600 feet. 
The theory of added weight increasing rigidity came about with use 
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of concrete decks instead of wooden decks. This resulted in a decrease 
in girder depth as spans increased. This is shown in Table 5. The 
importance of weight as a stiffening factor was realized in the George 
Washington Bridge. It had a center span of 3,500 ft. and a suspended 
weight of 68,000 tons. It had a depth of 29 ft. or 1/120 of the span 
length. It was ultimately planned to add a second deck for railway 
transportation and the stiffening was decreased assuming that the double 
deck would add to the rigidity of the bridge. Even before the second 
deck was added the bridge behaved very well under live loads and wind 
loads due to its weight. 
Engineers began to favor a greater amount of flexibility in their 
design and a decrease in weight was also taking place. This was the 
case in the design of the Golden Gate Bridge with a 4,200 ft. span and 
weight of 45,000 tons in the center span. The Bronx-Whitestone Bridge 
had a span of 2,300 ft. and weight of 13,000 tons and the Tacoma Narrows 
Bridge had a span of 2,800 ft. and weight of 8,000 tons. All these 
bridges experienced some oscillations but effective damping has been 
used. 
There has been some motion in all suspended bridges either vertically 
or laterally but none of any unusual character in spans up to 1,850 ft. 
nor in the San Francisco-Transbay Bridge of 2,310 ft. span. All of these 
have relatively rigid stiffening trusses and ample width which is unlike 
the Tacoma Bridge. 
The Golden Gate Bridge, completed in 1937, has experienced some 
torsional motions under moderate winds, but only slightly noticeable. 
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In 1938 and in 1941 there had been winds up to 75 and 62 m.p.h., re-
spectively. Vertical oscillations were then observed with amplitudes of 
approximately 2 feet. At the same time lateral movement of 8 and 5 ft. 
were observed. Weight is an important factor in the rigidity of the 
Golden Gate Bridge. 
The Bronx-Whitestone Bridge was subjected to wind forces which 
caused oscillation of large amounts but was corrected by damping instal-
lations as shown in Figure 36. Double amplitudes of 24 in. had been ob-
served with the most severe motion when the wind was at an angle less 
than 45° to the longitudinal axi~ of the bridge. The most severe motion 
also occurred when a single node was at the center of the bridge span. 
The bridge was more stable when exposed to winds of higher velocities. 
The weight of the bridge was the contributing factor in stability of the 
Bronx-Whitestone Bridge. 
Weight not needed to meet the design requirements is an expensive 
way to supply additional rigidity in long span suspension bridges, be-
cause even when added to the floor slab, which is relatively cheap, the 
weight involves considerable additional expense in increase of suspender 
size, cable size, towers and anchorage. Addition of weight to the floor 
slab increases the moment of inertia with a resulting decrease in deflec-
tions. 
The weight of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge was 6,270 lb per ft. An 
increase of 10 per cent by adding 2 in. to the thickness of the roadway 
slab would decrease the quarter point deflection by only about 5 per cent 
as seen in Figure 37. Increasing the weight by 100 per cent which could 
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be accomplished by doubling the traffic capacity, would decrease the 
static deflection near the quarter point from 1.59 ft. to 0.83 ft. which 
is a 48 per cent decrease. To make the bridge with rigidity like the 
Golden Gate and the Bronx-Whitestone the weight would have to be made 
2 1/2 times greater with the other proportions remaining the same. 
If the weight cannot be made to comply with the design requirements 
a decrease in the cable sag can accomplish the same result up to a point 
where the ad~ed expense becomes too great to make it economically feas-
ible. The added cost would be in the increase in cable size and in 
anchorages. This was a factor in the design of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge. 
The cable sag was decreased as much as economically feasible. 
The cable sag of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge was 232 ft. giving a 
ratio of cable sag to span of 1:12. A decrease of 10 per cent or a sag 
of 209 ft. would decrease the deflection at the quarter point from 1.59 
to 1.49 which is only 6.3 per cent. This could not supply the necessary 
rigidity alone. The effect of cable sag on deflection is shown in 
Figure 38. 
A comparison of vertical deflections under static loads on the 
various suspension bridges reflects their susceptibility to oscillations. 
The effect of weight as well as the stiffness of the suspended structure 
are reflected in their ability to resist vertical deformation. The 
dynamic rigidity is not considered, however, since damping effects are not 
reflected nor are other dynamic characteristics of the structure. 
The oscillations caused by wind forces are usually kept to a minimum 
which are acceptable by the public as they pass over the bridge. These 
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oscillations are usually not critical in the structural stability of the 
bridge. However, a rather small wind can cause large effects by acting 
longitudinally on the suspenders, cables and towers and also when acting 
directly at right angles to the structure. 
The regularity and frequency of the motion of the bridge is not 
necessarily due to the frequency and intensity of the wind forces but is 
largely due to the behavior of the suspension system of the bridge when 
acted upon by dynamic forces. The action of a suspension bridge is some-
times much more severe in a mild wind than in very large winds. The 
action of suspenders under the influence of wind forces greatly affects 
the cables. Freely suspended cables are very sensitive to displacements 
under forces acting in their vertical planes. Large oscillations ·are 
caused by the large amount of energy to which they are subjected and by 
the very little amount of energy absorbed by elastic deformation. The 
result is movement of the system and if not damped in some way the motion 
continues to build up. Model tests show that, after the dynamic impulses 
have stopped, the flexible suspension system continues to oscillate for 
a great length of time. 
The more flexible the system, the more the whole system tends to 
act as a free catenary and the motion will continue to increase as the 
capacity of the system to absorb energy decreases. Also the more flexible 
the system the more easily it oscillates in increasing numbers of waves 
or nodes at higher frequencies. The action of the cables will greatly 
control the action of the whole system if the stiffening girders are 
very flexible. The influence of the stiffening girders on the action of 
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the cable system is 1.3 per cent for the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, 2.5 per 
cent for the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, and 7.5 per cent for the Golden 
Gate Bridge. This means that the vertical deflections of the cables is 
decreased a very small amount in the Tacoma Narrows Bridge. The vertical 
flexibility is far in excess of that of any of the other bridges used in 
the comparison. These facts are given in the following table. 
Table 7. Comparative vertical deflections (56) 
Golden Gate Bridge 
Bronx-Whitestone Bridge 
without stays 
with stays 
San Francisco-Transbay Bridge 
George Washington Bridge 
For 1/4 point 
2.3 to 1 
2.6 to 1 
3.0 to 1 
4.0 to 1 
5.1 to 1 
For center of 
3.9 to l 
3.3 to 1 
3. 7 to l 
3.5 to l 
10.4 to 1 
These same results can be seen graphically in Figure 39. It is 
span 
apparent that the vertical deflection of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge was 
comparatively very large. 
Lateral motion of long span suspension bridges is not a matter of 
as much concern as that of vertical deflection. None of the bridges 
studied have had lateral deflections that became a threat to the struc-
tural stability of the bridge. The Golden Gate Bridge in a 75 m.p.h. 
wind storm had a lateral deflection of 8 ft., but this much of a 
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deflection was permitted in the design. This movement was not objection-
able to the motorists on the bridge. Lateral deflection is a result of 
average wind pressure on the exposed area of the structure. The rigidity 
in the lateral direction of the bridge with most flexibility in the 
vertical direction has been sufficient to resist any large oscillations 
in the lateral direction. The damping effect in the lateral direction is 
also great compared to that in the vertical direction. The moment of 
inertia is much greater about a vertical axis than about a horizontal 
axis. The Tacoma Narrows Bridge had a moment of inertia in the lateral 
direction of 35 times that in the vertical direction. The dynamic re-
sistance is even much greater than the increase in lateral moment of in-
ertia. 
The distribution of wind forces to the floor and cables for the 
Tacoma Narrows Bridge is shown in Figure 40 and illustrates the support-
ing effect of the cables on the wind truss. If the wind truss is rela-
tively flexible in the transverse direction much of the wind force acting 
on the suspended structure is transmitted to the cables and then to the 
towers. Even the most flexible and narrow long span suspended bridges 
have a relatively small amount of lateral motion. The lateral stability 
and deflection are largely independent of the rigidity and width of the 
wind truss. The rigidity of the wind truss in the lateral direction is 
a more important factor in resisting torsion when the vertical rigidity 
is insufficient. 
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